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The current dominant view is that the evolutionary pressures leading to our large brain 
sizes were predominantly social. This study investigates the effects of both technical 
and social pressures on our cognitive evolution, to determine whether the pressures 
were more complex than social theories allow. This is assessed both between hominin 
species and within our species. Between species effects are determined by evaluating 
the evolution of human cognition in 4 stages. Archaeological evidence of behaviour and 
changes in brain structure are presented for each stage. This allows specializations to 
be identified, and permits us to suggest whether specialization in each species was in 
response to social pressures, or a more complex pattern of both technical and social 
pressures. The results of this evaluation support a more complex pattern of 
evolutionary pressures. Within species effects are assessed, using Autism Spectrum 
Condition (ASC) as an example of an alternate, more technically focused, adaptive 
strategy. This condition accentuates technical behavioural traits which would be 
advantageous to a Palaeolithic population. The genetics of the condition show that it is 
highly heritable, was likely present prior to 200ka, and under positive selection. Thus, 
these technical traits must have had an impact on past populations. A survey is 
conducted to assess whether characteristics and components of autism would 
influence individual’s engagement with material culture, in particular art. It found that 
the technical trait, high attention to detail, was associated with experience of art and 
susceptibility to pareidolic illusions. Previously it has been suggested that illusions such 
as this may be implicated in the origins of art. This provides an example of how 
individuals with enhanced technical traits within our species may have affected our 
cultural evolution. Thus, the role of technical pressures in our evolution and how they 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Context and Significance 
  
The evolution of the human mind is a topic with resounding importance not just for 
academics and medical practitioners but also for the general population. The human 
mind is viewed as the factor that ultimately separates us from all other species. It is 
generally perceived as what makes us human. The innovative creations it facilitated 
have allowed us to colonize the earth and tailor it to our needs. The evolution of the 
mind is predominantly viewed as the development towards ourselves. 
  
The most prominent cognitive development highlighted in current research is our social 
ability. Theories of social evolution such as the Machiavellian Intelligence Theory 
(Byrne & Whiten, 1989), Social Brain Hypothesis (SBH: Dunbar, 1998; Dunbar, 1992), 
Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis (Donald, 2000; Hare, 2011; Herrmann, Call et al., 
2007), and the Self Domestication Theory (Hare, 2007, 2017), posit that nature 
positively selected for social attributes which enhance collaboration. The Machiavellian 
Intelligence Theory argued that the ability to cooperate with and manipulate others was 
the primary pressure on our intelligence. The SBH provided data showing a 
relationship between neocortex size and group size in primates and humans, which 
supported the Machiavellian theory. Thus, as group size increased social mechanisms 
became more complex, leading to more intelligent primates. These mechanisms 
allowed social groups to form a Cultural Intelligence. Groups were able to transmit 
cultural knowledge through generations, leading to the accumulation of more complex 
material cultures. Thus, it is currently thought that social selection was the primary 
evolutionary pressure for our increased intelligence. This selection for prosociality is 
thought to be so extreme that humans began to show signs of Self Domestication, 
through a reduction in brow ridge size and increased facial feminization.  
 
These theories have shown the impact of sociality on human evolution and will be 
explored further below. However, they do not recognize the importance of pressures for 
technical skills, such as perception, visualization, memory, and the systemization of 
information (see 2.1 for full definition). Thus, this project will evaluate the importance of 
non-social, technical evolution on the hominin lineage.  
 
The conflict between these two pressures may also have had a significant impact 
within species, with some individuals being more technically adept but less social than 
others. Variation such as this may promote new ways of thinking and broadens the 
minds of individuals in a diverse population, which helps produce novel solutions to 
group problems (Phillips, 2014). It may foster specialization and innovation, which can 
enhance aspects of material and social life (Spikins et al., 2016). And, on a species 
level, it may produce individuals adapted to different ecological, or social niches - thus 
increasing the adaptability of both the species and populations (Wilson, 1994). 
 
Autism Spectrum Condition (ASC) and variation upon the Autism spectrum is an 
example of cognitive difference within our species. Individuals who are high on the 
spectrum commonly have enhanced technical abilities, with a trade-off of social 
abilities. Some researchers claim that individuals with this condition are deleterious 
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offshoots (Bednarik, 2013; Pickard et al., 2011). However, attempts have been made to 
argue that this variation may have been a factor leading to our evolutionary success 
(Kellman, 1998; Spikins, 2009; Spikins & Wright, 2016; Spikins et al., 2016; Spikins et 
al., 2017). This is a factor which is rarely touched upon. However, creating more 
inclusive theories of evolution that account for the entire species and not just 
neurotypical individuals is highly important; firstly, to fully understand human 
evolutionary processes; and secondly, to increase awareness that cognitive difference 
doesn’t equate to disability.   
1.2 Aims 
The aim of this dissertation is to assess the impact of non-social technical evolutionary 
pressures on the human lineage, and consider the whether the traits of ASC, a 
condition which leads to more focus on technical rather than social stimuli, may have 
significantly impacted human evolution. 
 
This will be accomplished in 3 steps (see figure 1). Firstly, evolutionary pressures will 
be defined, and an overview of the current dominant theories presented. Secondly, the 
archaeological record will be evaluated to determine how social and technical 
pressures may have affected our ancestors’ development. Thirdly, the behaviour of 
individuals with ASC will be assessed and the impact of their traits on Palaeolithic 














Firstly, I will explicitly define what social and technical evolutionary pressures are. Then 
I will outline theories which regard social pressures as the most influential in human 
evolution. I will evaluate how these evolutionary pressures have affected our ancestors’ 
neurology, behaviour, and material objects. This will focus on several key changes. 
Firstly, the cognitive abilities of primates, in particular chimpanzees, will be assessed 
as an indirect measure for the possible capabilities of the LCA. Following this, I will 
assess the evidence of early Homo (predominantly Homo habilis), the first species to 
exceed the primate brain size limit and increase reliance on tools. Then Homo erectus 
and heidelbergensis, our first ancestors to reach 1000cc brain size and display an 
imposition of specific shape upon tools. Finally, the differences between Neanderthals 
and anatomically modern humans will be assessed due to their similar brain size yet 
vastly different lifestyles. 
 
I will then investigate the effect of the conflicting evolutionary pressures within our 
species, using Autism as an example of an alternate adaptive strategy. This will assess 
the impact autistic traits may have had upon Palaeolithic populations, and Palaeolithic 
artwork. I will review published research, reflect on debates, and then carry out my own 
case study.  
 
The case study will test the theory that individuals with Autism or autistic traits may 
have created Palaeolithic artwork, using a broad survey. This theory was posited by 
Humphrey (1998) and Kellman (1998), who discovered many similarities between the 
artwork of autistic savants and Palaeolithic artists, almost 2 decades ago. However, it 
has been revived by Spikins and her colleagues in a different format, suggesting that 
autistic traits may have impacted not only art, but material culture, and the minds of 
those around them (Spikins, 2009; Spikins & Wright, 2016; Spikins et al., 2016; Spikins 
et al., 2017). This has been met with counter arguments by Bednarik (2013, 2016) and 
Pickard et al. (2011). Among their criticisms is that the theory has a lack of empirical 
support. Therefore, this survey attempts to test the theory using empirical data to rectify 
this issue. The survey will test the hypothesis that characteristics and components of 
autism influence individual’s engagement with material culture, in particular art. If 
individuals with high autistic traits are better able to identify hidden figures in 
Palaeolithic artwork the hypothesis is supported. By assessing this I aim to emphasise 
the importance of analysing cognitive variation, which provides new avenues for 
interpreting prehistoric material culture, and explore whether technical traits have had a 





Chapter 2: An Introduction to Evolutionary 
Pressures 
This chapter will define social and technical evolutionary pressures, and will explain 
how they will be evaluated in later chapters (2.1). It will then outline the theories 
supporting the dominant view, that evolution for social abilities was the primary 
development in the hominin lineage, and how this view became so influential. This will 
also explore the faculties which are thought to have developed as a result of increased 
sociality: theory of mind, language, and due to facilitation from the previous functions, 
technological proficiency (2.2).    
 2.1 Defining Evolutionary Pressures on Cognition 
There are two evolutionary pressures affecting cognition which are assessed in this 
study: social pressures, and technical pressures. While there are other evolutionary 
pressures, such as environmental stressors, which could be analysed, for clarity and 
due to limitations of space we will focus on these two. 
 
Social pressures relate to the stressors of group living. When social group size 
increases, complexity increases. There are more individuals to interact, be wary of, and 
compete with. Nevertheless, large groups increase foraging success and mitigate 
predation (Dunbar, 2009). However, strategies must be developed to reduce the costs 
for the advantages to be worthwhile. These costs may be reduced by forming alliances, 
understanding others’ minds, communicating, and tracking group dynamics. There are 
therefore many different functions and, consequently, areas of the brain which were 
affected by social pressures.  
 
Technical pressures are an umbrella term used within this thesis to describe pressures 
related to functions such as perception, visualization, memory, hand-eye coordination, 
and the systemization of information. These traits may give many advantages. A better 
ability to perceive hidden figures, such as predators and prey, within the landscape. 
Enhanced abilities for visualizing a desired form within raw material. A greater memory 
for the past locations of vital resources. Greater systemization of the environment, and 
thus more accurate predictions of future resource locations, and a more structured use 
of the landscape. The defining feature of technical pressures and the resulting abilities, 
is that they are non-social and related directly to an individual’s ability to functionally 
utilize the environment around them. Social functions may enable groups to utilize an 
environment more effectively, however they would have no effect on an isolated 
individual’s survival. In comparison, technical functions would enhance an isolated 
individual’s survival. Further, these skills would also benefit social groups.  
 
I will assess the impact of these pressures by evaluating the evolution of human 
cognition. This will be accomplished by investigating archaeological evidence for 
changing behaviour, such as site structure and material culture, and by assessing what 
structures of the brain have changed through time. This will enable me to propose what 
functions are developing, and thus what effect technical and social pressures have had 
on our evolution at a species level. This evaluation will focus on 4 stages: Primates (to 
estimate the capacities of the LCA), Early Homo, Homo erectus and heidelbergensis, 
Neanderthals and Humans. Following this, I will use Autism as an example of an 
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alternate adaptive strategy, which causes enhancements in technical skills, but 
difficulties in social skills, to investigate the impact these pressures may have had 
causing variability within our species, and determine whether individuals with this 
condition may have had a significant positive impact on Palaeolithic groups.  
 
Firstly, we will assess how social cognitive evolution became the dominant narrative 
and the current state of this theory. 
 
 2.2 Social Cognition, the Dominant Narrative 
Currently, theories relating to our sociality are the most popular explanations for our 
large brain sizes and complex behaviour. Three ‘social theories’, as they will be 
collectively labelled, have become particularly prominent: The Social Brain Hypothesis, 
Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis, and Self-Domestication Hypothesis. However, prior to 
this boom of social literature, complex tool production, was considered the defining 
feature. At this time tool production was largely regarded as separate from sociality, 
and thus under this logic it was thought that technical pressures and skills led to its 
development.  
 
Darwin (1888, pp. 26–64) stressed technology’s important role on evolution, and for the 
majority of the 20th century developments in tool production and subsistence strategies 
were considered to be the primary pressures of human evolution (Hill, 1982). It was 
thought that when tool use developed, it was so adaptive that the rate of evolution 
quickened, and the brain expanded to specialize in tool use (Lancaster, 1968; Oakley, 
1954). This then allowed a transition from frugivory to meat eating and colonization of 
savannah habitats (Dart, 1934; Kortlandt, 1962). When classifying Homo habilis as a 
member of our genus, precision grip and the hominins association with stone tools was 
emphasised. This ultimately led to the species’ name, habilis, meaning ‘handy’ (Leakey 
et al., 1964). This demonstrates just how dominant the view of hominin technical 
specialization was. 
 
However, it must be noted that even at this time there was an appreciation for the 
importance of sociality. Darwin (1888, pp. 26–64) understood that we are social 
animals with specialized cognitive skills (such as empathy) for this purpose. He 
believed that we developed to our current state through selection for intelligence in tool 
making and selection for sociality in tandem. While research continued to stress the 
importance of social selection, it was largely a secondary point. For example, Bruner 
(1965) and Lancaster (1968) highlighted the importance of cultural transmission and 
teaching to the development of material culture. Washburn (1960) stated that the areas 
of the brain most expanded in humans are those used for social functions. However, he 
still believed that specialization for tool production was the primary development. But 
more socially oriented theories were available. Etkin (1954) believed that tool use 
created pressure for increased intelligence. However, he believed that social functions 
initially facilitated the development of complex technology. Through analysis of lemurs, 
which showed that they may possess advanced social intelligence while having 
rudimentary technical intelligence, Jolly (1966) posited that sociality preceded technical 
ability. Similarly, Humphrey (1976) argued that social games of plotting and counter-
plotting were responsible for the intelligences of primates and humans alike. During the 
1980s, theories such as this became more prominent. Lovejoy (1981) rejected the idea 
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that subsistence strategies and tool production were the primary pressures for human 
specialization. Instead he suggested that a unique reproductive strategy, with extended 
childhood, intensified parenting, and stronger social relationships was pivotal to the 
origin of our species. But it was Byrne and Whiten’s (1989) Machiavellian Intelligence 
Hypothesis which brought popularity to the theory that sociality is responsible for our 
intelligence. This integrated the works of Jolly and Humphrey and suggested that the 
ability to cooperate with and manipulate others was the primary pressure leading to our 
intelligence (Byrne, 1995). Thus, suggesting that social complexity was the primary 
driving force of cognitive evolution. 
 
The work of Dunbar and colleagues on the Social Brain Hypothesis (SBH) provided 
support for Machiavellian Intelligence. The human brain is approximately 3 times larger 
than expected for a primate of our size, with a neocortex 61% larger than expected 
(when humans are excluded from the regression line: Rilling & Insel, 1999). Dunbar 
(1992) found a quantitative relationship between relative neocortex size and group size 
in primates and humans (DeCasien et al., 2017; Dunbar, 1998). This relationship is 
robust, with 70% of group size variation being species relative and correlating with 
neocortex size (Sandel et al., 2016). This theory has been highly influential. The SBH 
has been used to suggest changes in social structure, ToM ability, language, and 
technology in past hominins (Cole, 2012; Dunbar, 2003, 2009; Gamble et al., 2011; 
McNabb, 2012). 
 
The SBH depends on social group size as the feature that predominantly increases 
pressure on social cognition. There are two primary reasons why animals merge into 
large groups, either to aid foraging or to mitigate predation through group cooperation 
(Dunbar, 2009). A combination of these two pressures is most likely to be the motive 
for past hominins, particularly following the introduction of more meat into the diet, as 
foraging tactics would have been synonymous with increased predation risk (O’Connell 
et al., 1988; Treves & Naughton-Treves, 1999). Following the formation of larger 
groups, competition for food and harassment by others, which has been shown to 
decrease reproductive success in females, may have increased (Dunbar & Shultz, 
2007). Therefore, coping mechanisms would have been necessary to overcome new 
social stressors. Among modern primates these pressures are reduced by forming 
alliances through grooming, which creates a sense of obligation to aid an individual 
who is under attack or struggling to find resources (Dunbar, 2004).  Our closest 
relatives, chimpanzees, form their strongest bonds with individuals who are either 
maternally related or the same rank when grooming is shared equally (Mitani, 2009). 
However, more complex appraisals of the social structure of the group are also used. 
The most successful individuals form coalitions with individuals who do not have bonds 
with each other. This suggests that they are aware of the relationships of others and 
can utilize this knowledge to their own advantage (Gilby et al., 2013). Hence, for our 
closest relatives, grooming and the manipulation of social information are integral 
mechanisms to mitigate the negative effects of group living.  Due to grooming clique 
size and other displays of social complexity (lower ranked males mating more 
successfully, juvenile social play, and use of deception)  correlating with neocortex size 
in primates, it supports the notion that social Machiavellian functions are the primary 
cause of encephalization in both primate and human evolution (Byrne & Corp, 2004; 




As brain size increased through the hominin lineage, the SBH posits that group size 
increased beyond the primate limit. Consequently, grooming times would have 
exceeded the primate maximum of 20% of their total day (Dunbar, 2004). For example, 
if modern humans invested in grooming to the same proportions as primates, our group 
size means we would spend approximately 43% of our day grooming (Dunbar, 2003). 
Therefore, alternative methods of sociality were needed. Theory of Mind (ToM) and 
language are posited to be the primary coping strategies hominins developed to 
manage increasing group sizes. 
 
ToM is the ability to infer the thoughts and beliefs (mental states) of other individuals. 
This is measured in levels of intentionality. For example, intentionality level 1 is the 
ability to infer one's own beliefs, whereas level 2 is the ability to infer another 
individual’s beliefs or thoughts, level 3 is the ability to understand someone’s beliefs 
about another individual. Humans are thought to be able to reach level 5 intentionality. 
ToM is suggested to have developed in a stepped progression in hominin species 
through time as brain size and group size increased (Gamble et al., 2011; McNabb, 
2012). 
 
Language is another function hypothesised to have developed to mitigate the costs of 
increasing group size and allow a further increase in group size (Aiello & Dunbar, 1993; 
Dunbar, 2003, 2017). Contrasting to ToM, language is thought to be a recent 
progression. It is argued that wordless singing was adopted by Homo erectus (500ka) 
to replace grooming. This led to the establishment of the anatomy needed for language 
(Dunbar, 2003, 2017). However, the capacity to use the grammatical structure needed 
for language is thought to have developed between 300ka and 80ka, with no clear 
consensus on whether language is human specific or Neanderthals and possibly earlier 
hominins possessed the ability (Atkinson, 2011; Dunbar, 2003; Johansson, 2013). 
Dunbar (2004) suggests that language requires intentionality level 2 or higher and that 
this facilitates interaction with 3 individuals simultaneously, therefore allowing humans 
to spend social time more efficiently and increase group sizes. This also reduces the 
human social time to the expected 20%. Thus, the SBH views language as a cognitive 
function which developed because of increased group size and processing power to 
make sociality more efficient. This allowed group sizes to increase further, increasing 
selective pressure for sociality, which in turn increased the complexity of language (and 





Figure 2. Hominin brain size plotted against time with orders of intentionality in 
numerals inside boxes (McNabb 2012). 
 
Both ToM and language have been associated with technological proficiency. Hence, 
through association technological ability is regarded as a product of sociality, rather 
than technical pressures. ToM has been associated with technology in three ways. 
Firstly, the transmission of technological information is thought to be facilitated by 
mirror neurons, which are located in areas of the brain associated with ToM. These 
neurons activate when an individual performs an action. However, they also create an 
empathetic response when observing another’s actions, and activate as if the observer 
was performing the action themselves. Development of the mirror neuron system is 
thought to have accentuated imitation ability, leading to an evolutionary progression 
from undirected emulation (seen in non-human primates), to high fidelity imitation, and 
finally intentional imitation utilizing ToM perspective taking. This is posited to be the 
cause of increased technological innovation through time as it facilitated a greater 
spread of new ideas and their integration into material culture (Hodgson, 2013). 
Secondly, increasing complexity in stone tool production has been related to increases 
in levels of intentionality, with it further being suggested that technology became social 
as well as functional when intentionality level 3 was reached (Cole, 2012). Thirdly, 
Acheulean handaxes are thought to require a minds-eye view similar to higher levels of 
intentionality (Gamble et al., 2011). The Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis argues that 
our enhanced ability to learn the collective skills of a social group and transmit 
knowledge through generations allowed the accumulation of material culture (Donald, 
2000; Herrmann et al., 2007; Tomasello et al., 2005). Thus, the social abilities to share 
intentions, collaborate, understand other's minds, teach, and learn led to the complex 
technological knowledge of the hominin lineage (Hare, 2011).  
 
Language has been suggested to relate to technology because lateralization of the 
brain for precise tool production involving two hands may have been the 
protoarchitecture needed for language (Ambrose, 2001). Further, the Broca’s area 
(associated with the motor functions of language) is derived from areas related to fine 
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motor hand control. It is suggested that as the frontal cortex expanded areas related to 
syntactic language became more pronounced and specialized, similarly as this took 
place areas related to object manipulation became more complex, allowing the 
production of more complex tools (Greenfield, 1991). Finally, it has been suggested 
that the production of lithic tools is directly comparable to the production of structured 
syntax, with both requiring production by conventional rules, anticipation of the next 
action needed, and an understanding of the overall goal (Stout & Chaminade, 2012). 
This has led to the suggestion that we may use the complexity of the material record to 
infer lingual complexity (Vieira, 2010). Further, I would argue this suggests that the 
evolution of technical abilities for tool production and social abilities for language 
coevolved.   
 
The selection for prosociality is suggested to be so extreme that humans began to 
show features of domestication syndrome (Hare, 2007, 2017). From the Middle 
Pleistocene onwards, our ancestors had more feminized and trustworthy faces, with 
smaller brow ridges, suggesting reduced testosterone and increased social tolerance 
(Cieri et al., 2014). Our uniquely white sclera has also developed to reveal gaze 
direction and increase both the ability to share attention to cooperate, and the ability to 
trust another individual (Hare, 2017). Thus, the impacts of social pressures are now 
seen to account for, not only the development of technology, but changes in bodily 
features. While the impact of self-domestication has been recognized since Darwin’s 
(1888, pp. 26–30) reflections upon the topic (Washburn, 1960), it has only recently 
gained traction within the context of the current focus on human sociality.  
 
To sum up, there has been a shift in thought away from the view that pressure for 
increased technical ability are responsible for our cognitive evolution. The current 
dominant view is that social pressures, due to increasing group sizes and complexity, 
are responsible for our intelligence. Primates cope with increased social stressors by 
creating alliances through grooming and may use information on the social dynamics of 
the group to form more profitable alliances. However, in the hominin lineage group size 
(as inferred from brain size) increased beyond the primate limit. Therefore, alternative 
strategies were needed to mitigate increasing social pressures. ToM, language, and 
increased tolerance are suggested as efficient adaptations that allowed social group 
size to continue to increase. It is argued that ToM developed in tandem with group size, 
language developed within the last 300ka, and tolerance gradually developing since 
the Middle Pleistocene, with the latter two facilitated by enhanced ToM abilities 
(Gamble et al., 2011). Further, these abilities have been associated with technological 
proficiency in a number of ways. Thus, it is now considered that social pressures are 
responsible for our intelligence. 
 
To test how well this theory explains changes in the archaeological record, hominin 
encephalization will be evaluated in 4 stages, utilizing the three stages identified by 
Gamble et al. (2011):  
 
(1) Primates: specifically focusing on our closest relatives, chimpanzees, and their ToM 
abilities to infer the skills of the last common ancestor (LCA).  
 
(2) Early Homo: when hominin brain size first exceeded the primate limit and the 




(3) Homo erectus and heidelbergensis: when brain size exceeded 1000cc, migration 
increased, and tool shape became standardized with social functions.  
 
(4) Neanderthals and Humans: when brain size reached modern sizes, focusing on the 
differences between Neanderthal and human social and material culture.  
 
This will allow the strengths and flaws of the theory, and the impact of technical 
pressures, to be identified. Following this, the theory will be assessed in relation to 
Autism, a condition associated with social differences which may cause difficulties, but 
also leads to many technical advantages which would be beneficial to a hunter 





Chapter 3: An Evaluation of Conflicting 
Evolutionary Pressures Between Species 
This chapter will evaluate what impact social and technical pressures have had on our 
evolution at a species level. Firstly, we will investigate the social and technical abilities 
of primates, in particular chimpanzees, and assess whether they have theory of mind. 
This will give an estimate of the capabilities of the LCA, and provide a beginning for 
how these skills may have developed in the hominin lineage (3.1). We will then assess 
the archaeological evidence of behaviour and changes in brain structure, for Early 
Homo (3.2), Homo erectus and Homo heidelbergensis (3.3), and Neanderthals and 
Humans (3.4), to determine the impact of both social and technical evolutionary 
pressures on these species.  
3.1 Primates 
 
By using primates, and in particular chimpanzees, as an indirect way to assess the 
capabilities of the LCA, it is hoped that this will provide a beginning for how social skills 
and in particular ToM have developed in the hominin lineage. However, it must be 
recognised that chimpanzees have also been developing and specializing for the past 
6 million years. This is highlighted by their stark behavioural differences from bonobo’s, 
with whom they diverged 2-3Ma. Therefore, although this provides an approximate 
theory of the capabilities of the LCA, divergent and convergent evolution during the 
past 6Ma do not allow a clear picture to be developed. However, when cautious some 
inferences may be made.  
 
As shown above, primates may use social information to create the most profitable 
alliances. ToM and the virtual appraisal of group dynamics are thought to be integral to 
human complex sociality. However, while it has been suggested that great apes may 
possess these abilities, there is a clear difference between ape ability and human 
ability. Many researchers therefore conclude that these skills have become 
accentuated through the hominin lineage. To investigate how social skills may have 
developed in the hominin lineage we must first determine how they operate in primates. 
 
As social group size increases, structural complexity and group dispersal must 
increase due to limited resources. This means that changes within the group may not 
be visually seen by all group members and more complex mechanisms are needed to 
appraise the state of the group. Changes must instead be mentally represented, based 
upon brief meetings, mental representations of those who aren’t present, and 
inferences based up other’s behaviour. Consequently, in fission-fusion societies, such 
as chimpanzee groups, mental simulations of group dynamics are paramount to 
understanding the social state of the group and assessing the value of alliances, an 
ability shown above to increase reproductive success and the probability of increasing 
in rank (Barrett et al., 2003). The Social Brain Hypothesis argues that group size 
increased through time (Dunbar, 1998). Therefore, the ability to simulate group 
dynamics would have been under high selective pressure. Barrett et al. (2003) argue 
that this virtual appraisal may be a precursor to ToM. From this it is clear that 
chimpanzees have mental abilities abstract from the present that allow the simulation 
of group dynamics. This provides a beginning for the development of ToM and 
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advanced social skills. However, it does not display the extent of chimpanzees 
mentalizing abilities or answer Premack and Woodruff’s (1978) question, ‘Does the 
Chimpanzee have a Theory of Mind’. 
 
Premack and Woodruff (1978) first answered their question by concluding that 
chimpanzees understand desires, intentions, and affective attitudes but not the 
knowledge an individual holds. As this subject developed the mind attributed to 
chimpanzees and the wider primate clade has become much more complex. Hare et al. 
(2001) have shown that they understand what others see and that this information can 
be used socially. This has been corroborated by observations of wild subordinate 
chimpanzees deceptively hiding their genitals from more dominant males while still 
keeping them in view of females (Byrne & Whiten, 1992). This form of deceptive 
behaviour has been shown in all anthropoid primates. However, rates of deception 
correlate with neocortex size and only great ape deception suggests mentalizing, with 
monkeys showing only learned associations (Byrne & Corp, 2004; Byrne & Whiten, 
1992). Call and Tomasello (2008) have conducted a meta-analysis of 30 years of 
studies in this subject and concluded that, due to lack of evidence of the ability to 
attribute false beliefs, chimpanzee cognition is ‘perception-goal’ oriented rather than 
‘belief-desire’. However, previous observations of wild chimpanzees calling selectively 
to individuals who are ignorant of a danger shows that in a natural setting they may be 
able to understand the false beliefs of others and use this information to ensure group 
safety (Andrews, 2017; Crockford et al., 2012).  Recent laboratory experiments have 
also yielded positive results for the ability to understand false beliefs. By using eye 
tracking technology and a more amusing false belief test scenario than usual to capture 
the apes attention, Krupenye et al. (2016) have shown that chimpanzees, bonobos and 
orangutans anticipatorily look in the direction where the agent falsely believes an object 
to be, rather than its true location. This suggests at least an implicit understanding of 
false beliefs (de Waal, 2016; Kano et al., 2017; Krupenye et al., 2016). Buttelmann et 
al. (2017) have also shown, using two false belief helping tasks compared to true belief 
and ignorance conditions, that great apes can understand false beliefs and that this 
alters their helping behaviour. Therefore, showing that in a laboratory setting 
information of other’s beliefs can be used socially.  
 
However, the evidence for ToM in great apes is still unclear with many suggesting 
either that they do not possess full ToM or that they possess no ability to attribute 
mental states and that positive results are due to the use of learned logical 
associations (Penn et al., 2008). For example, Hare et al. (2001) used a competitive 
feeding paradigm, and found that subordinate individuals approached the food more 
often when the dominant chimpanzee was uninformed, suggesting that they 
understood what the dominant knew. Penn and Povinelli (2007) critiqued these results 
by suggesting that this response was equally likely to be due to rules developed from 
past experience, ‘Don’t go after food if a dominant who is present is oriented towards it’ 
(Penn & Povinelli, 2007). They believe that the ability to infer mental states is human 
specific. In their view, humans have evolved beyond the abilities of chimpanzees in 
both the ability to infer goals from behavioural cues and by developing a second 
‘representational system’, which interprets behavioural cues in an abstract mentalistic 
way independent of the task being performed (Penn & Povinelli, 2013). They and many 
other researchers believe that the current experimental methods do not possess the 
ability to distinguish between mentalizing and goal oriented behavioural reading (Lurz, 




Call and Tomasello (2008) have attempted to rectify this issue by suggesting that being 
able to infer a goal despite the agent making mistakes shows a division between 
behaviour reading and attributing mental states. Penn and Povinelli (2013) disagree, 
arguing that the intention could be logically determined behaviourally. These 
contradictions make it impossible to progress in the subject. If no current test can 
distinguish between attributing mental states and behaviour reading, then neither 
theory can be nullified or verified. All positive results for ToM can be attributed to 
behaviour reading, and all negative results can be credited to not understanding the 
behaviour. For example, the false belief test has been suggested to be the defining 
test, as it is the only test able to reliably display that an individual understands the 
mental view of others (Penn & Povinelli, 2013). The inability of primates to pass false 
belief tests (before now) has been viewed as evidence of lacking a ToM. However, put 
within the contradiction above this is either the case, or they do not understand the 
behaviour the same way as humans. This has been noted by Andrews (2017) who 
suggested this is similar to Vinden’s (1999) results, which showed using three non-
western populations that they may have a different ToM that isn’t activated by western 
false belief tests. Further, as is shown in studies of Autism, when the task is 
understood hacking strategies reliant on understanding behaviour and perception that 
don’t require ToM may be used to pass the test (Frith et al., 1991; Happé, 1994). Even 
when positive results have been found, such  as Krupenye et al.’s (2016) study, they 
have been critiqued in the same way by Heyes (2017), who has suggested that visual 
aspects of the scene, rather than mentalizing, dictated the apes eye movements (when 
the individual with the green shirt appears the primates looked where the object was 
last time that colour was present because it acts as a cue). Such contrasting views 
have led to a stalemate, due to the individual biases of researchers. 
 
Currently, we may not confidently conclude that chimpanzees possess or lack a full 
ToM as no unbiased method is currently being used by either side of the debate. 
However, we can conclude that chimpanzees utilize complex social mechanisms to 
both mitigate the costs and enhance the benefits of group living. They may: (1) 
understand what another individual has seen or heard in the present and the near past 
and use this information both competitively (Byrne & Whiten, 1992)  and collaboratively 
(Crockford et al., 2012), even if this is not linked to a mentalistic attribution of 
knowledge or even what object within their gaze they are observing (Hare et al., 2001; 
Hostetter et al., 2007; Melis et al., 2006; Povinelli et al., 2000; Tomasello et al., 2003); 
(2) attribute goals to other individuals, either through an understanding of the other’s 
mind during the activity and in relation to other activities (Call et al., 2004; Call & 
Tomasello, 2008; Uller, 2004), or through systematic reasoning of the behaviour (Lurz 
& Krachun, 2011; Penn & Povinelli, 2013).  
 
Either way it is clear that this facilitates complex social behaviour. Further, I would 
argue that many negative results for ToM are a product of the abstract methods used in 
labs to test for them. The social complexity of wild chimpanzees outweighs what has 
been observed in labs. For example, contrary to what has been stated by Penn and 
Povinelli (2013) chimpanzee mothers from Taï have been seen to teach their young 
how to crack nuts (Boesch, 1991). In one case an adult chimpanzee noticed a juvenile 
struggling with an oddly shaped hammer. The adult took the tool and slowly rotated it 
for a full minute into the correct position. The adult then cracked several nuts and gave 
back the tool. The juvenile continued to crack nuts using the position it had been 
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shown. Even when the juvenile had further difficulties it did not alter how the tool was 
gripped. This example shows the teacher understood the goals of the juvenile even 
though they were making mistakes. Further, active teaching shows that they may share 
joint attention and enforce attention upon an object. This is an essential prerequisite to 
ToM (Baron-Cohen, 1991). They have then used this to convey a meaning. When the 
chimpanzee rotated the tool, the action was slowed to aid the understanding of the 
juvenile. A mentalistic interpretation of this action would be that the adult chimpanzee 
understood that the juvenile wouldn’t understand the action unless it was slowed down 
and the importance amplified - thus making allowances for an uninformed mind. A 
behavioural interpretation of this would be that through past experience the 
chimpanzee has realised that demonstrations need to be slowed or the juvenile won’t 
be able to imitate. Either way, this is more complex behaviour than what has been 
shown in a lab setting and it has been suggested by Penn and Povinelli (2013, p. 71) in 
their denunciation that chimpanzees don’t teach, that this would show, ‘an ability to 
reason about others’ goals as internal representational states’. This is convincing 
evidence for at least the beginnings of ToM in wild chimpanzees.  
 
The evidence is becoming more convincing despite opposition. However, what is clear 
is that there are two systems that facilitate complex sociality, a behavioural system (a 
complex form of systematic behaviour reading), and a ToM system. This is similar to 
Apperly and Butterfill’s (2009) suggestion that understanding beliefs relies upon two 
systems, one inflexible and efficient (behavioural system), the other flexible yet 
inefficient (ToM). This is consistent with Bermúdez’s (2003) suggestion that the 
majority of our sociality is a product of primitive structures rather than ToM. However, 
the inflexibility of this structure is thought to be overestimated and it is suggested that 
some form of multi-system architecture utilizing executive function is most likely to be 
the precursor to ToM (Bermúdez, 2003; Christensen & Michael, 2016). I believe 
Central coherence is also likely to be vital to this system as it requires the integration of 
a wide range of information to form a view of another’s behaviour. 
 
Clearly, chimpanzees are highly proficient in using the behavioural system for 
understanding other’s actions. However, it is unclear whether they possess a ToM due 
to biases in the subject. Based upon the current evidence it may be suggested that 
while they may not possess a full ToM they possess some form of lesser mentalizing 
ability which is rarely used and cognitively demanding. This mentalizing may be an 
extension of the behavioural system which allows a faint and imprecise view of another 
individual’s mind.  
 
Chimpanzee’s technical abilities are also relatively complex. As shown above, they are 
capable of using tools. However, their ability is more complex than commonly 
assumed. Apes in comparison to monkeys have a greater understanding of cause and 
effect when using tools, thus making them more adept at tool use tasks (Visalberghi et 
al., 1995). Further, the chimpanzees from Fongoli, Senegal have been shown to use 
spears produced in a 5-step procedure to hunt bushbabies (Gibbons, 2007; Pruetz & 
Bertolani, 2007). I believe this shows that chimpanzees are able to keep a desired goal 
in mind for an extended period of time, while completing steps to achieve the objective, 
suggesting a greater working memory than has been suggested by some authors 
(Read, 2008). Thus, their complex tool use is facilitated by complex technical abilities, 
as well as the social transmission outlined above. They have also been shown to use 
long term spatial memory to enhance foraging ability, by remembering and 
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approaching particular high yield trees in a goal directed manner in separate seasons 
and years (Janmaat et al., 2013). Chimpanzees may also have a better spatial working 
memory than humans (Inoue & Matsuzawa, 2007). Although, this has since been 
critiqued, suggesting that when under the same test conditions humans outperform 
chimpanzees (Cook & Wilson, 2010). Finally, it has been shown that chimpanzee and 
human short-term memory is similar. Each can remember no more than 5-7 objects. 
However, humans may use language to expand the functional use of this limited space. 
For example, by remembering 5 phrases, rather than words (Premack, 2007). We can 
suggest from this, that while chimpanzees have complex technical skills in certain 
areas, largely they are more accentuated in humans.             
 
It is likely that the LCA had many of these technical and social abilities, and a highly 
sophisticated behavioural system. However, as noted at the start of this section, 6 
million years separate chimpanzees from the LCA and further behavioural evolution is 
likely to have taken place. Therefore, while we may make inferences about the LCA 
based upon chimpanzees and other primates, it is important to note that these are 
tentative rather than definitive conclusions. What is most important to recognize from 
this section is that understanding other individual’s minds is a large adaptation which 
may not have occurred in one motion, but may have gradually developed with the 
cognitive demand lessening, interpretations of other minds becoming clearer and the 
frequency of use increasing through evolution until a clear level 2 intentionality was 
formed. Further, interpretations based upon behavioural reading rather than ToM can 
lead to complex sociality. Therefore, this comparison with primates provides a 
beginning to understanding the linear adaptation of ToM as a gradual progression 
derived from behaviour reading that was likely starting to form within the LCA, and 
highlight the vast social developments our lineage has made. We must also recognize 
that the technical abilities of the LCA were likely complex, with sequential tool 
production already established and advanced spatial memory supporting foraging. 
However, many technical functions, including those assessed here, were greatly 
accentuated within the hominin lineage. 
 
3.2 Early Homo 
Archaeological Evidence of Behaviour 
Early Homo is not the earliest user of stone tool technology. Stone technology likely 
has a longer history, as is seen by the chimpanzee and capuchin use of unmodified 
stone tools (Proffitt et al., 2016), the sophistication of the Oldowan technocomplex 
which suggests prior experience, and hand morphology suggesting hominin tool use 
was possible by 3.2Ma (Panger et al., 2002). However, early Homo was more reliant 
on stone tools and used more complex technology. This likely facilitated greater access 
to meat or a more versatile diet, which would have allowed higher energy budgets and 
increased selection pressures for more technologically and socially adept groups 
(Plummer, 2004). Gamble et al. (2011) highlight several further examples of 
technological complexity. Selection and transport of particular materials to increase 
flaking success (Stout et al., 2005). Use of prepared cores which have been shown to 
increase cutting edge and reduce waste (Brantingham & Kuhn, 2001; de la Torre et al., 
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2003). Possible inclusion of meat shown by high δ13C values in hominin enamel (Lee-
Thorp et al., 2010; Sponheimer et al., 2013; Sponheimer & Lee-Thorp, 1999).  
 
I argue that these examples suggest increased pressure for technical ability. The use 
of prepared cores suggests the beginnings of a ‘mind’s eye’ to visualize the final form 
of a tool. Further, although it is unclear from isotopic data due to lack of evidence (Lee-
Thorp et al., 2007), greater reliance on tools may suggest increased meat 
consumption, or at least a more versatile diet relative to Australopithecines (Ungar et 
al., 2006). Meat consumption would put hominins in competition with predators and put 
pressure on the ability to identify hidden figures in the environment, spatial memory of 
where prey and predators are frequently located, and understanding the systems of the 
environment. However, these examples also suggest increased social complexity. 
Increased and complex tool production suggests greater social learning and social 
cohesion to find resources. Meat consumption would suggest a greater emphasis on 
cooperation to overcome predators during scavenging or hunting (O’Connell et al., 
1988; Treves & Naughton-Treves, 1999), and sharing during consumption (Plummer, 
2004). This would allow higher energy budgets and permit brain sizes to increase. 
Further, if meat consumption did not increase, a more versatile diet would have led to a 
more seasonally stable energy intake which has been shown to enable increased brain 
sizes (Navarrete et al., 2011). 
 
At this time there was a shift to more open C4 grassland replacing C3 woodland, with 
smaller scale fluctuations causing variability within this (Lee-Thorp et al., 2007). To 
adapt to this Homo habilis and Australopithecines became more generalist feeders, as 
stated above. This is shown by the high individual variability in δ13C which indicate 
different levels of C4 plant consumption (Lee-Thorp et al., 2007, 2010; Sponheimer & 
Lee-Thorp, 1999; van der Merwe et al., 2008). Contrasting to this, chimpanzees in 
savanna areas with predominantly open C4 grassland feed almost exclusively in 
smaller forested or wooded areas, consuming C3 plant foods, showing high reliance on 
particular resources, and little consumption of meat (Sandberg et al., 2012; 
Schoeninger et al., 1999). An increase in dietary breadth would have allowed the two 
hominin species to survive more comfortably in these highly variable environments.  
 
Resource acquisition skills, as show at Gona (2.6Ma) by the selection and 
transportation of stones of a particular quality for tool production (Stout et al., 2005), 
would have been easily transferable for foraging and scavenging. This would be 
particularly useful in more arid conditions, when resources would be sparser, and 
selective stone acquisition would act as a form of practice during more humid periods. 
Thus, the technical ability to acquire spatial knowledge of the environment and 
recognize desirable resources for foraging, was not only under natural selection, but 
also under artificial selection during times when resources were plentiful. Additionally, 
the increase in dietary breadth to incorporate C4 foods suggests selective pressure on 
long-term memory to remember what resources are edible.  
 
Social pressures would also affect this last point, with increased cultural knowledge 
being imperative for groups to collect the more generalized diet, in a similar way to how 
later hominins would collect knowledge of material inventions. The transition to more 
open environments has also been argued to increase fission when searching for 
resources (Gamble et al., 2011). As shown in the previous section, this increases 
pressure on social aspects of the brain to simulate the dynamics of an invisible group. 
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Finally, increasing predation as the environment became more open would further 
intensify social selection. 
 
Hence, the archaeological evidence suggests that both social and technical abilities 
were under intense pressure to develop. 
 
Changes in Brain Structure 
At this time brain size increased to approximately 600cc. From this increase in brain 
size we may infer several interpretations. Physiologically, we may infer that an 
alternative diet, reduction in digestive tract, less adipose depots, or a smaller locomotor 
impact of adipose depots must have developed to account for the increased energetic 
cost as the number of neurons in the brain increased (Aiello & Wheeler, 1995; 
Fonseca-Azevedo & Herculano-Houzel, 2012; Herculano-Houzel, 2011; Navarrete et 
al., 2011). Behaviourally, according to the SBH we may infer that Homo habilis reached 
group sizes of between 70 and 100 individuals (Gamble et al., 2011). If social bonding 
was formed through grooming when group sizes reached this size, Homo habilis would 
have exceeded the maximum limit that primates allow for grooming, 20% of their daily 
time (Dunbar, 2004). Therefore, different strategies must have been utilized to reduce 
social time. As seen in modern primates this may be achieved through increased 
vocalization and fission (Lehmann et al., 2007). Therefore, following the social theories, 
rearrangements in social and neural structure must have taken place in early Homo to 
facilitate larger group sizes and the skills outlined above. 
 
Several visible neural rearrangements took place early in the hominin lineage. Firstly, 
the lunate sulcus (between the primary visual cortex and the parietal cortex) was 
reconfigured. This increased the size of the parietal and temporal association cortices 
and decreased the visual cortex and indicates an improvement of visuospatial and 
sensorimotor abilities used in object manipulation (Holloway, 2015; Sherwood et al., 
2008). This change is also significant because the junction between these two areas, 
the temporo parietal junction (TPJ), is consistently activated by ToM, empathy and 
testing internal predictions (Carrington & Bailey, 2009; Decety & Lamm, 2007; Samson 
et al., 2004). Expansion of these two areas may have enhanced internal representative 
abilities. Secondly, the frontal lobes and temporal poles, linked to general social 
cognition, facial recognition, the mediation of social behaviour and ToM, began to 
expand (Mychack et al., 2001; Olson et al., 2007; Saxe & Powell, 2006). Particularly, 
Brodmann’s area 10 in the medial prefrontal cortex, associated with abstract thinking 
and planning future actions based upon past experiences (particularly in a social 
context), expanded (Euston et al., 2012; Falk et al., 2000). This suggests that more 
complex cognitive mechanisms abstract from the present reality were beginning to 
form. Thirdly, the Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas enlarged with an overall shift to more 
human-like asymmetries (Gibson, 1991; Tobias, 1987, 2009). This has prompted 
debate over whether language was present in Homo habilis. However, due to the 
positive allometric relationship between grey matter and white matter (Rilling & Insel, 
1999), it is likely that a brain of 600cc did not have the integrative mechanisms 
necessary for language. Nevertheless, expansion of these regions may have facilitated 




Additionally, modern FMRI studies of individuals knapping Oldowan technology have 
shown activation of visuomotor elements of the parietal cortex, the right hemisphere 
homologue of the Broca’s area, and the medial prefrontal cortex, suggesting co-
evolution of language and tool production (Stout et al., 2011; Stout et al., 2008). These 
areas have been shown above to be expanded in Homo habilis, therefore providing 
support and a neural mechanism for the species having enhanced technological 
abilities.  
 
The neural changes presented here show that the overall cortical architecture of 
hominins at this time was becoming increasingly more human. Following McNabb’s 
graph (2012: figure 1), it is suggested that this period represents the time when 
hominins were approaching level 3 intentionality. A level which suggests the ability to 
create and accept social norms (Dunbar, 2003). A more conservative estimate is 
presented by Gamble et al. (2011) of level 2 intentionality being reached at this time.  
 
These changes would have facilitated the more complex sociality needed for an 
expanded and dispersed group and would likely have allowed allogrooming times to 
decrease to the expected 20%. Further, these new skills may have begun to replace 
allogrooming, due to selection for hairlessness to reduce ectoparasite load (Pagel & 
Bodmer, 2003; Rantala, 2007). Therefore, complex socio-cognitive adaptations were a 
major change at this time.  
 
However, due to the association of many of the expanded regions to technology, and 
the expansion of regions related to object manipulation it is clear that the selective 
pressures were not wholly social, and were perhaps more complex than the current 
literature allows, with a significant impact from technical pressures.  
 
To sum, increased C4 grassland and environmental variability led to greater social and 
technical evolutionary pressures. This provoked many behavioural changes in early 
Homo, ranging from an increased reliance on tools, to greater social cooperation. The 
neurological changes which took place to facilitate this behaviour, show expansions in 
areas related to object manipulation, ToM, and broader social cognition. However, 
many of the areas related to social cognition, and in particular language, are also 
associated with tool use. This suggests that both technical and social pressures were 
significant in cognitive evolution at the time, and that as well as modules of the brain 
specializing for either social or technical abilities, they could also coevolve for both.   
 
3.3 Homo erectus and Homo heidelbergensis 
Archaeological Evidence of Behaviour 
The shift to Homo erectus and Homo heidelbergensis is characterized by an increase 
in brain size to 1000cc, an increase in population sizes and densities (inferred from site 
distributions and material densities), larger body size, increased dispersal, 
standardization of tool shape, stasis in material culture, and exaggerations of size and 




Site distribution and material densities suggest an increase in both group and 
population sizes (Hawks et al., 2000; Klein, 2009), which put further pressure on social 
abilities. The SBH identifies this population expansion, with estimations of population 
density correlating with brain size (Bailey & Geary, 2009), and a large increase in brain 
size at this time suggesting an increase in group sizes to 100-120 individuals (Gamble 
et al., 2011). Social theories suggest that increased group sizes at this time forced the 
brain to rapidly evolve. Larger groups would have to disperse further to find resources 
(Gamble et al., 2011). Consequently, putting more pressure on the ability to simulate 
group dynamics, thought to be a precursor of ToM (Barrett et al., 2003), and may 
explain some of the exaggerated features of stone tools. 
 
At this time the environment became more arid, and by 1.6Ma open grassland 
dominated (deMenocal, 2004; Lee-Thorp et al., 2007; Maslin et al., 2014). Due to these 
environmental stressors, as well as disease and parasitic stressors, Homo erectus 
began to disperse sporadically into Europe and Asia (Bar-Yosef & Belfer-Cohen, 2001; 
Larick & Ciochon, 1996). In order to survive in new, open, and varied environments 
they would have required a more generalized toolkit, with new inventions. For example, 
the use of projectiles as seen at Boxgrove would enable hunting in more open regions 
(Roberts, 1997). It must also be noted that Homo erectus is physically more suited to 
open air habitation than previous hominins with complete terrestriality, longer and 
stronger hind limbs (Ruff, 2009), and endurance running (Bramble & Lieberman, 2004). 
This likely greatly facilitated migration. Home ranges could be increased due to more 
efficient mobility, enabling the aggregation of resources from a wider area and less 
reliance on individual sources. Particularly important for the finding of water in an 
increasingly arid environment (Finlayson, 2014, pp. 69–83). 
 
I believe their survival in more varied, open, and arid habitats, increased movement out 
of Africa or within Africa, and increased population sizes are likely to have required 
stronger social cohesion and enhanced social abilities, which are thought to be the 
drivers of further encephalization leading to Homo heidelbergensis. Groups which were 
previously tethered to more vast and permanent sources of water were now required to 
search for more seasonally ephemeral bodies of water. They were required to disperse 
further on a local (group) and global (species) basis to find resources and were forced 
to be less selective for familiar foods or easier prey, likely leading to the hunting of 
larger game (such as at Boxgrove). This increased risks from predation, but also 
starvation and dehydration if they travelled to the wrong areas (Finlayson, 2014, pp. 
69–83). Such stressors create conflict between groups for resources, which further 
requires collaboration and social skills to overcome competitors, trust in others 
suggesting where to go for resources would be needed, technical spatial abilities to find 
and remember the seasonal layout of the environment would be imperative, and 
alternate social mechanisms would be necessary for a group which would be highly 
fragmentary for a large proportion of time as they searched for resources. 
 
These developments are reflected in the material culture, which transformed 
dramatically at this time.    
 
Tool shape became standardized by Homo erectus 1.5 million years ago. This 
standardized toolkit was characterized by large cutting tools (LCTs) such as bifaces, 
picks, and cleavers, which dominated until 300ka (Ambrose, 2001). The 
standardization of these forms suggests that the maker holds a mental image of their 
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desired tool and how it will be formed during production, an advanced technical ability. 
There are alternative explanations for their forms, such as rates of reduction. However, 
the theory that toolmakers have a predetermined goal is currently the most accepted 
view (Dibble, 1995; McPherron, 2000).  
 
This strict adherence to form is beyond functional and therefore is present for a 
different most likely social reason (Machin et al., 2016, 2007). It has been argued that 
highly symmetrical handaxes may be used for sexual display as an indicator that the 
maker has good health and intellect (Kohn & Mithen, 1999). This was refuted due to a 
lack of support for aspects of the theory: an absence of evolution in handaxe form as 
different anatomical features were being selected as sexually attractive in the 
toolmakers; evidence for cooperation in handaxe production showing that it may not be 
an indicator of individual ability; better indicators of health being available (Machin, 
2008). However, it was applauded as the first attempt to explore the social element of 
this material. Hodgson (2009) proposed a more technical theory, suggesting the ritual 
production of symmetrical objects provides comfort. He argued that the affinity for 
symmetry developed prior to the production of symmetrical objects to increase 
detection of living organisms (highly symmetrical) among inanimate objects, as 
symmetry prompts further scrutiny of visual stimuli. Through time the ventral ‘what’ 
system located in the inferior parietal lobe, and dorsal visuo-spatial systems located in 
the superior parietal lobe became increasingly integrated. This allowed increased 
motor planning, increased mental rotation abilities, and more interest in ‘what’ objects 
are and hence their categorization. Consequently, as the parietal lobe increased in size 
and intra-connectivity between 1.6Ma and 300ka, these skills allowed the 
predisposition to symmetry to be acted upon (Hodgson, 2009, 2005). Even if the 
production of handaxes is determined by a preadapted predilection towards symmetry 
it is clear that, as well as representing a neurological change in areas associated with 
technical ability, it is a wide social change, possibly signifying the earliest symbolic 
cultural thought (Le Tensorer, 2008). Perhaps the affinity to symmetry merely dictated 
the form that the symbol took. Whether this symbol was a competitive sexual display, 
or a collaborative display of trust as suggested by Spikins (2012), it clearly represents a 
fundamental change, socially, technically, and neurologically.  
 
At this time physiological changes are suggested to promote social changes. Increased 
body, brain sizes and their associated energetic costs imply a greater reliance on 
nutrition dense foods such as underground storage organs and meat (Aiello & Key, 
2002). Greater cooperation would be required to obtain the large amounts of energy 
needed either through active hunting, scavenging, or competing against predators for 
carcasses. Homo erectus clearly accentuated the gathering and hunting skills of Homo 
habilis. However, evidence for more extreme forms of cooperation than attaining food 
are evident at this time. The transportation of meat to areas of group occupation 
suggests that sharing may have occurred (Isaac, 1978). Individualistic hunting or 
reward based upon hunt participation do not account for the energetic costs of Homo 
erectus. Aiello and Key (2002) suggest that when pregnant or nursing, mothers would 
be unable to provide themselves with the energy they needed. Therefore, cooperation 
was key and was managed in several ways. Grandmother’s and older siblings helped 
to care for children, and males provided resources to increase their likelihood of mating 
(Lovejoy, 1981). This collaboration decreased interbirth intervals and increased 




However, this collaboration requires individuals to reduce their own gain in order to 
help another. While food sharing is seen in chimpanzees it is largely in response to 
begging by reciprocating allies, close kin, harassers or to increase the probability of 
mating (Silk et al., 2013). It is reasonable to suggest that sharing functioned in this way 
in Australopithecines with slight developments in Homo habilis. However, Homo 
erectus and Homo heidelbergensis show more selfless prosocial forms of sharing. 
KNM-ER 1808, a Homo erectus individual from Koobi Fora (1.6Ma), suffered from 
hypervitaminosis A, a condition caused by over ingestion of liver which led to abnormal 
bone growth up to 7mm thick over all long bone shafts and reduced bone density 
(Walker, 1981). The condition likely reduced mobility and led to dependence on others. 
In order for the individual to survive long enough for the illness to be present on the 
bones, they would have needed care from others for weeks or possibly months 
(Spikins et al., 2010). A second example is the Dmanisi hominin from Georgia who lost 
all but one tooth several years before death and would have required care 
(Lordkipanidze et al., 2005). Evidence of a herniated disc in the lower lumbar region of 
a Homo erectus from Nariokotome (1.5Ma), which occurred several months before 
death suggests social care (Haeusler et al., 2013). The final examples are from Sima 
de los Huesos (approximately 500ka), where late ancestors of Neanderthals cared for 
a child with craniosynostosis, an elderly individual with locomotive difficulties, another 
individual with ear hyperostosis which likely caused deafness, and one with a severe 
dental abscess (Bonmatí et al., 2011; Gracia et al., 2009; Meyer et al., 2016; Pérez et 
al., 1997). Examples such as these have been used to suggest that hominins were 
becoming more compassionate at this time (Spikins et al., 2010; Spikins, 2017).  
 
Reduced sexual dimorphism through the hominin lineage may also support this 
suggestion (see figure 3), as lower dimorphisms suggest less male-male competition 
and pair bonding. Further, following the Self-Domestication Hypothesis, increased 
feminization suggests lower testosterone levels and increased tolerance (Hare, 2017). 
However, studies may exaggerate dimorphisms in Australopithecines due to small and 
fragmentary samples sizes, imperfect sexing, and inaccurate proxies for calculating 
body weight  (Larsen, 2003). 
 
Combining this increased evidence of sharing, care, and collaboration with the 
suggestion that handaxes were a social display of trust (Spikins, 2012), it may be 
concluded that handaxes had multiple functions. Firstly, they fulfilled an aesthetic 
predilection to symmetry as the parietal lobe became more connected and provided 
comfort. Secondly, they were a display of social trust that the maker had the patience 
to care for something or someone without the prospect of return. Thirdly, this display of 
care likely increased the probability of mating due to females preferring males who 
would aid them during pregnancy. Importantly, the first two functions are not male 
specific. Therefore, while it may be more profitable for males to produce handaxes, it 
would still have been profitable for females to produce them. 
 
The comfort provided by a highly symmetrical handaxe may have also functioned in 
another way. Spikins et al. (2010) suggest that with modern humans objects began to 
be cared for as symbols of supportive relationships. A 10-fold increase in the home 
range sizes of Homo erectus relative to Australopithecines may have caused this 
mechanism to develop earlier than thought (Antón et al., 2002). Spikins (2012) 
suggests that handaxes may remind others of an individual’s trustworthiness. I argue 
this would be most effective if the handaxe was gifted to another individual, so that 
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while they were away from the maker the object was a source of comfort in times of 
stress or loneliness and reminded them of the maker. An increase in raw material 
transport distances from ≤1 km to ≤15 km at this time has commonly been used to 
suggest extensive planning prior to stone tool use (Marwick, 2003). However, the 
extensive transportation of hand axes combined with their elaborate form and Homo 
erectus’ large home range may support their use as comfort objects. This would enable 
social bonds to be strengthened and reaffirmed even when an individual was absent, a 
method which may be made even more efficient if multiple individuals helped produce 
a single handaxe. This would have provided an alternative to language to aid 
increasing group sizes and helped stabilize a dispersed group. 
 
As can be seen, hominins at this time would have been under high pressure to adapt 
technically and socially. The increasingly open environment and arid conditions would 
have led to selection for individuals with a better understand of the systems in the 
natural environment and enhanced spatial abilities to find and remember the seasonal 
layout of the environment. Further, the ability to detect hidden predators and prey may 
have been even more selectively advantageous. This intense pressure may have led to 
the predilection to symmetry described above (to detect animals), which was then 
acted upon when producing handaxes. At the same time, greater group sizes, 
dispersal, energy requirements, and predation would have increased social pressures. 
This likely led to increased collaboration, a better ability to visualize group dynamics, 
and new methods of socializing utilizing material culture to strengthen bonds. But what 
neurological changes took place for these skills to develop? 
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Figure 3. Hominin female body weight as a percentage of male body weight, higher 
percentage suggests less dimorphism (data from Leonard & Robertson 1994; Leonard 
et al. 2003; McHenry & Coffing 2000; Sorensen & Leonard 2001). 
 
Changes in Brain Structure 
With the speciation of Homo erectus brain sizes reached an average of between 800-
1000cc (Bruner et al., 2015). Due to their increased body size, they had a similar 
relative brain size to Homo habilis. This has been used to suggest that they had similar 
intelligence levels (Wynn, 2002). However, relative brain size remained fairly constant 
until the speciation of Homo sapiens (Kappelman, 1996). Therefore, unless a unique 
change occurred in the hominin lineage we would have to suggest intellectual 
progression was static for 2 million years, a conclusion which contrasts with the 
material record. 
 
Several advances in comparative neurology rectify this issue. Deaner et al. (2007) 
conducted an analysis of primate intelligence and found a greater relationship with 
absolute rather than relative brain size. This is due to intelligence correlating with 
number of neurons and their conduction velocity (Roth & Dicke, 2005). The density and 
velocity of which remains the same through the primate clade, including in humans 
(Azevedo et al., 2009; Herculano-Houzel, 2009, 2012). Therefore, increases in brain 
size through human evolution correlate with intellectual capacity. Due to the high 
expense of additional neurons, great apes usually trade an increased brain size, for a 
decreased body size (Herculano-Houzel, 2011). As can be seen in figure 4, brain size 
increases consistently through time (B). Meanwhile body size decreases through time 
until Homo erectus when body size shows a sharp increase (A), indicating that this was 
the time when body size and brain size became disconnected (chimpanzees are used 
as a proxy for the LCA). The separation between the two was likely facilitated in two 
ways. Firstly, cooking, as seen at Gesher Benot Ya’aqov (790kya), and indicated by a 
smaller jaw size, and energy requirements for female Homo erectus suggesting that 
they would have had to chew raw meat for 5.7-6.2 hours per day (Alperson-Afil & 
Goren-Inbar, 2006; Fonseca-Azevedo & Herculano-Houzel, 2012; Wrangham & 
Conklin-Brittain, 2003). Secondly, by reducing gut size, a highly expensive tissue 
(Aiello & Wheeler, 1995). This would have been facilitated by eating higher quality 
food, likely through cooking. As shown by figure 4B this untethering sped up 







Figure 4. (A) Hominin average body weight (kg) separated by male and female. (B) Average Hominin Brain size (g). (data from Ben-Dor et 
al. 2011; Leonard & Robertson 1994; Leonard et al. 2003; McHenry & Coffing 2000; Sorensen & Leonard 2001).  
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Enlargement of the brain from Homo habilis to Homo erectus was predominantly 
allometric (Holloway, 2015). However, there are some differences between Homo 
erectus, older hominins and later hominins which are highly relevant for this evaluation. 
 
As stated above the frontal and temporal poles began to expand with Homo habilis. 
However, with the speciation of Homo erectus they were still flatter and narrower than 
in modern humans (Bruner et al., 2015; Wu et al., 2006). Initially, in earlier individuals, 
the frontal lobes were not an area of great change. However, evidence from Java 
suggests this species progressed. Earlier fossils from Trinil and Sangiran display 
narrow and flat frontal lobes. Whereas, Later fossils in Java, such as at Ngandong and 
Sambungmacan, have wider frontal areas suggesting a progressive evolution of this 
component. This population was isolated and has been suggested to represent a 
distinct taxon, Homo soloensis (Bruner et al., 2015). Nevertheless, this is a distinct 
change which has been caused by ecological constriction of the population leading to 
enhancement of the primary social area of the brain. This was likely exacerbated by an 
environmental shift from open savanna and forested areas to more closed rainforest 
environments, further limiting habitable space (Bettis et al., 2009; Finlayson, 2014, p. 
61). Relating this to the general evolution of the frontal lobes, it is currently unclear due 
to lack of evidence whether the proportions of cortical areas changed significantly in 
Homo heidelbergensis. Nevertheless, overall neural rearrangements were progressive 
towards a more refined human layout, with the same regions as in Homo habilis 
undergoing evolutionary change, with no perceivable outliers (Holloway, 2015). The 
frontal lobes continued to broaden in width until in Homo sapiens it also began to 
expand in height (Albessard et al., 2016). The overall expansion of the frontal lobes 
was allometric to overall brain size since the LCA, thus internal changes must have 
occurred which led to higher levels of cognition (Broadfield et al., 2001). 
 
Non-allometric enlargement of the prefrontal cortex, with increased gyrification has 
taken place, however when this happened isn’t discernible on the endocasts (Buckner 
& Krienen, 2013; Sherwood et al., 2008). More directly, it has been shown using 
endocasts that the Broca’s area increased in size through the hominin lineage. Balzeau 
et al. (2014) used the third frontal convolution, where the Broca’s area is located, to 
create a quantitative method of analysing the evolution of this area. They found that the 
relative size of convolution was highly variable between individuals, that it increased in 
size through the hominin lineage, and that contrary to common belief the convolution 
had an extended length on the right side relative to the left. The left area is smaller, 
compact, and more defined than on the right. It is currently unclear what implications 
this has for the evolution of language, but the primary conclusion should be that the 
evolution of this area was continuous through time towards larger third frontal 
convolutions and a more defined Broca’s area. The result of this is that the convolution 
was becoming more functionally lateralized, with the left specializing in lingual 
processing of the direct structures and sounds of speech, while the right specialized in 
contextualizing what is said and the tone in which it is spoken (Stout & Chaminade, 
2012). 
 
The lateralization of the brain is also related to handedness, with increased 
lateralization leading to right handed populations. It is clear from the striation patterns 
from Sima de los Huesos that the population predominantly used their right hands, with 
all individuals (N=20) in one study showing right oriented striations (Lozano et al., 
2009) and 16 out of 21 showing right handedness in a second study (Poza-Rey et al., 
34 
 
2017). However, research into the lateralization of the Broca’s area and the petalias 
are less definitive suggesting a proportion of 4/6 right handers to left handers rather 
than 9/1. This suggests that while handedness was becoming established, the 
lateralization of the brain and neural specialization was still in development. Therefore, 
the motor abilities both for tool production and speech, as well as the ability to process 
more complexly structured forms of each (Stout & Chaminade, 2012), continued to 
develop in Homo erectus. They had more control and precision in tool production, as 
evidenced by the material record described above, and more advanced (yet still 
limited) lingual abilities (Klein, 2017).   
 
Due to the movement of the lunate sulcus in Homo habilis, the parietal lobe increased 
in proportional size. The lobe continued to increase in size allometrically with the rest of 
the brain, but with an extra-allometric increase in width of the inferior parietal areas 
(Bruner et al., 2015). As stated above, the integration of the inferior and superior 
parietal cortices may have led to the development from Oldowan to Acheulean 
technology (Hodgson, 2005, 2009). I agree with Hodgson, that selective expansion of 
the lower parietal areas may have stimulated the categorization of objects, while the 
integration of this area with the superior parietal cortex would have enabled 
visuospatial abilities to be used to create more complex, symmetrically appealing, 
categorized objects. This interpretation is supported by limited activation of the inferior 
parietal lobe during Oldowan tool production when compared to Acheulean tools, which 
suggests shape production was not a primary aim or that the area was not developed 
enough to be capable of such production (Stout et al., 2000; Wynn, 2002). Wynn 
(2002) has shown that through this period the affinity to symmetry became more 
accentuated and complex. Firstly, bifaces were produced with two-dimensional bilateral 
symmetry of the edges. Then as the brain (and inferior parietal cortex) expanded, in 
particular with the speciation of Homo heidelbergensis, symmetry in stone tools 
became three dimensional. Spatial abilities were increased, individuals could 
simultaneously integrate multiple perspectives of an object and create near identical 
symmetry. The selective pressures for this are outlined above, however the biological 
determinants remain unclear due to a lack of evidence from endocasts (particularly 
Homo heidelbergensis). I suggest that the increase in the inferior parietal lobe and 
intra-connectivity of the entire lobe likely had a large impact. This is particularly 
significant as the inferior parietal cortex expanded significantly more than the superior 
parietal cortex and it was only with Homo sapiens that the superior cortex began to 
expand more rapidly. The attention to shape enabled by the inferior parietal cortex 
increased planning capabilities, and the ability to visualize a wanted object on the blank 
material (Hodgson, 2009; Stout et al., 2000). Further, this area has been implicated in 
taking others perspective, understanding the intentions of others and has been shown 
to be part of the mirror neuron system (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006; Chong et al., 
2008; Fogassi et al., 2005). This is likely connected to ToM and imitative ability, giving 
it a social element. However, I argue this provides an explanation for how Homo 
heidelbergensis in particular was representing multiple perspectives of an object at 
once. If an individual can represent the perspective of another individual (particularly 
one they haven’t experienced themselves) then representing a perspective they have 
just seen would be a simple task and may be the starting point for true 
metarepresentational abilities. 
 
The parietal lobe was increasing in overall size, with allometric expansion of the 
superior parietal cortex and non-allometric expansion of the inferior parietal cortex. The 
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lobe became more intra-connected allowing the integration of visuospatial and shape 
recognition information and the production of more consistent, symmetrical, and 
aesthetically pleasing tools. The expansion of this area also had social implications for 
imitative abilities and empathic neural responses. Therefore, I suggest that fitness in 
this area of the brain and hence symmetrical, congruent tool production may have a 
more direct neural affiliation with trustworthiness and compassion than first suggested 
by Spikins (2012). Although, it must be noted that these social functions employ 
multiple modules. Thus, the evolution of the parietal cortex is unlikely to be solely 
responsible for this change. 
 
The human temporal lobe is larger than expected for a primate of our size, with 
significantly more white matter. Due to the displacement of object recognition areas 
ventrally and laterally by lingual areas which are highly connected to the prefrontal 
cortex, it has been suggested that this enlargement and increase in white matter was to 
facilitate lingual abilities (Rilling & Seligman, 2002). Homo erectus compared to earlier 
hominins had wider temporal lobes (Bruner et al., 2015). Therefore, we may speculate 
that they had more enhanced lingual capabilities. An increase in white matter in this 
lobe, particularly the posterior regions, further enhanced its associative abilities. This 
would aid in both linguistics and tool production, leading to an alternative form of 
sociality and the creation of the Acheulean technocomplex. By increasing the intra-
connectivity of the posterior temporal cortex and its inter-connectivity with the frontal 
and parietal lobes the abilities to imbue objects and sounds with functional meaning, 
process more complex hierarchically structured information (such as how to produce a 
tool or structure a sentence), and integrate visuospatial and sensorimotor information 
to produce congruent pleasing tools and sounds to be categorized with specific 
functions, would have been enhanced (Stout & Chaminade, 2012). Thus, this 
enhanced both technical abilities, process more complex hierarchical information, and 
social abilities, imbuing objects and sounds with meaning. Further, by enhancing 
connections between these areas mind reading abilities are likely to have improved, as 
the temporoparietal junction, superior temporal sulcus and inferior parietal cortex are 
significantly active during tests of ToM (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006; Carrington & 
Bailey, 2009; Lewis et al., 2011; Shultz & Dunbar, 2012). 
 
These abilities, both technological and social, would not be directly comparable to 
human abilities due to the reduced width of the frontal cortex, size of the prefrontal 
cortex, the flattening of the parietal cortex and lower laterality. Further, the Homo 
erectus brain is 72-84% its maximum size at 1 year of age, similar to chimpanzees. 
This suggests a shorter-range connective layout in the brain than in modern humans 
and later hominins (Coqueugniot et al., 2004). Thus, it is highly improbable that they 
would have reached the higher levels of intentionality attained by humans. Compared 
to earlier hominins, however, they were more capable of understand the minds of those 
around them, and most probably reached intentionality level 3. 
 
At this stage it is suggested by McNabb’s (2012) predictive graph that Homo erectus 
had level 3 intentionality and Homo heidelbergensis reached level 4 intentionality. This 
overlaps with the modern human male mean of 4.41 (Stiller & Dunbar, 2007). 
Therefore, unless we suggest that Homo heidelbergensis possessed advanced human-
like social abilities we must suggest that the species possessed a different degree of 
clarity, accuracy and processing ability when inferring mental states at level 4 (as 
described above for chimpanzees) or that they had a lower level of intentionality. Due 
36 
 
to the standardization of technology, it is clear that social norms were being adhered to, 
therefore intentionality level 3 must have been reached (Dunbar, 2003). Reinforcing 
this, Gamble et al. (2011) suggest that the ability to manipulate multiple factors of flint 
when producing a handaxe and utilize a ‘mind’s-eye’ during production requires similar 
skills to higher levels of intentionality. Nevertheless, for level 4 to be reached there 
must be signs of ritual or religion (Dunbar, 2003). Controversially, this may be present 
at Sima de los Huesos, Atapuerca, where the ‘ritual’ burial of 28 individuals (commonly 
attributed to Homo heidelbergensis) with the earliest grave good, a highly symmetrical 
quartzite handaxe, took place (Carbonell & Mosquera, 2006). However, it is unclear 
whether this was religious as many other explanations exist for this artefact. McNabb 
(2012) concluded that despite the predictions of figure 1, the Acheulean toolmakers 
were unlikely to have a full theory of mind, but nevertheless had a more defined sense 
of self and other. I would add to this and suggest that they did understand the minds of 
others, perhaps not to the level of modern humans but the cases of compassion and 
advanced cooperation without sign of a direct personal gain suggest that a network of 
moral judgement was in place. For such a system to operate understanding how others 
view you is a prerequisite.  
 
In conclusion, site distributions and material densities at sites suggest an increase in 
overall population and group size at this time. This increase in population put stress on 
an already depleting environment and therefore required individuals to disperse further. 
Dispersal occurred both locally and globally. Individuals within groups increased their 
home range and groups migrated across Europe and Asia as they adapted to more 
marginal environments. These conditions required enhanced social and technical 
abilities. Particularly as environments would have been more open, leading to 
increased predation, and more difficult and competitive resource acquisition. The social 
evolution that took place was the origin of compassion and cooperation, which led to 
hominins being more effective at finding resources and being able to gain access to 
more novel resources such as meat. Cooperation also allowed more expensive energy 
budgets to be reached, particularly important for pregnant females. But such a 
collaborative social system requires trust, particularly in marginal, arid, and open 
environments with high predation. Handaxes may have had multiple functions to aid in 
this environment, by providing comfort, displaying an ability to care for another through 
caring for the object and reminding individuals of, or even enhancing their bonds with, 
others while they are away. This final point may have been imperative in highly 
dispersed groups. Nevertheless, they also represent a considerable change in 
technical ability. They display an ability to process more complex hierarchical 
information, visualize multiple perspectives of an object, and produce a predetermined 
visualized usually symmetrical form. This predilection to symmetry in material objects 
may also signify an enhanced ability to identify symmetrical objects in the landscape, 
thus enhancing individual’s ability to detect hidden animals. Thus, the hominins of this 
period were likely under complex evolutionary pressures, not only social but also 
technical, and adapted accordingly.  
 
Further research using Homo heidelbergensis endocasts would greatly benefit the 




3.4 Neanderthals and Humans 
Archaeological Evidence of Behaviour 
This period was characterized by a further transition in technological culture, the 
habituation and extinction of Neanderthals in Eurasia, the speciation of Homo sapiens 
and their movement into the Eurasian plains, a human specific ‘revolution’ in social 
material culture including the advent of representational art, the existence of a hominin 
species with a larger brain size than modern humans, and the advent of true language. 
This section will assess whether Neanderthals and Anatomically Modern Humans 
(AMH) adapted differently to the social and technical evolutionary pressures of the 
time.     
 
The Palaeoenvironmental record at this time in Europe is punctuated by 5 oxygen 




       Figure 5. Estimated variations in temperature during the last glacial cycle using 
oxygen isotope and deuterium ratios from the Voztok ice core, with oxygen isotope 
phases marked (After Jouzel et al. 1987). 
 
This rapid environmental change would have required extensive adaptability. Social 
and technical mechanisms would have been under more pressure than in previous 
time periods, and hence cortical areas would have been forced to adapt. Interestingly, 
the two species of Homo present at this time appear to have distinct adaptive 
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strategies for coping with this change. AMH are argued to have adapted socially, which 
allowed increased material invention, specialization, and more structured landscape 
exploitation. Whereas, Neanderthals are suggested to have been more static at this 
time in both technological and social innovation, relying on the biological suitability of 
environments rather than culturally adapting to conditions (Finlayson, 2004, pp. 125–
128; Kuhn & Stiner, 1998; Lewis-Williams, 2004, pp. 69–101; Pearce et al., 2013). 
 
These differences are proposed by many authors to be responsible for the extinction of 
Neanderthals and success of AMH (Banks et al., 2008; Bar-Yosef, 2013; Gilpin et al., 
2016; Horan et al., 2005; Wynn et al., 2016). By assessing the social, technical, and 
neurological differences between the two hominins we will explore how they each 
adapted to the complex evolutionary pressures.  
 
The social structures of Neanderthals and AMH differ largely. Group size estimates for 
Neanderthals are highly variable ranging from as high as 143 when averaging Aiello 
and Dunbar’s (1993) data utilizing overall cranial capacity or 115 when accounting for 
the larger size of the Neanderthals visual cortex (Pearce et al., 2013), to as low as 8-10 
based upon the sleeping area size at Abric Romani, El Sidron, and Barakaevskaya 
(Hoffecker, 1999; Lalueza-Fox et al., 2011; Vallverdú et al., 2010). These estimates 
likely define the term ‘group’ differently, with the first referring to the whole social 
network and the second representing a single family or hunting/foraging party, 
henceforth referred to as a ‘group’. However, the lower figure has been used recently 
by Nakahashi (2017) to estimate innovation rates, and it was suggested that 
communication with more than 10 individuals would be difficult. I believe this 
conclusion greatly underestimates the sociability of Neanderthals. As stated above this 
figure likely represents a single hunting party. Further, with skeletal damage indicating 
severe injury on almost every reasonably complete Neanderthal skeleton (Berger & 
Trinkaus, 1995), I argue it is unlikely they would have been able to survive in such 
small groups. If they did, provisioning care for someone unable to contribute would be 
a substantial sacrifice - particularly if it was long term, as the ‘Old man of Shanidar’ 
would have needed (Spikins et al., 2010). Likewise, Aiello and Dunbar’s (1993) and 
Pearce et al.’s (2013) estimations based upon the SBH overestimate the sociability of 
this hominin. The SBH estimates are supposed to encompass a collection of 
individuals that you would expect to complete a personal favour (Dunbar, 2003). The 
population density of Neanderthals has been estimated to be between half the size and 
ten times lower than that of Aurignacian AMH (Bocquet-Appel & Degioanni, 2013; 
Mellars & French, 2011). The latest estimate suggests a much higher population size in 
the tens of thousands. However, the authors found high rates of genetic drift, 
suggestive of a small population size. Therefore, they suggested that the large 
metapopulation consisted of small isolated populations with little contact (Fabre et al., 
2009; Rogers et al., 2017). Hence, I argue Neanderthals would have had much less 
contact with other groups and group sizes would have been much lower than those of 
AMH. This is particularly demonstrated by the inbreeding seen in the Altai Siberian 
Neanderthal genome (Prüfer et al., 2014). 
 
Contrary to this evidence, Hayden (2012) has assumed, based upon generalizations 
from ethnographic evidence, that Neanderthals must have had connections with 450 
other individuals in order not to die out. He states that Neanderthal groups must have 
been between 12-24 people and had connections with 10-20 other groups in order to 
survive. If these bonds did form they are unlikely to have been as intimate as those 
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affecting the development of the social skills, as is displayed by a lack of long distance 
(>100km) down-line trade in finished objects (Féblot‐ Augustins, 2009), a common 
feature in AMH social networks, and the genetic evidence for isolation cited above. 
Nevertheless, I agree that connections must have existed in some form between 
groups, at least intermittently. Perhaps this took the form of immigrations for mating as 
is seen in chimpanzees (Luncz & Boesch, 2014). Due to a lack of material evidence 
these connections are currently difficult to understand. 
 
The ability to have long distance bonds is likely to have been affected by environmental 
conditions. Féblot-Augustins (1993) suggests that mobility was higher in areas of harsh 
climatic variability and high prey mobility, which provoked intergroup interaction. 
However, in the northern latitudes and in eastern Europe, populations were subject to 
bottlenecks causing a decrease in population density (Hawks, 2013; Hoffecker, 1999). 
An increase in distance between groups combined with more difficult travel conditions 
may have made inter-group collaboration impossible leading to increased inbreeding. I 
would suggest that inbreeding in these regions would decrease during interstadials and 
increase during stadials. This is supported by the Altai Neanderthal who, although not 
directly dated, is thought to have lived prior to 50ka (Prüfer et al., 2014). This puts the 
individual within the glacial conditions of OIS 4 (or at least the recovery stage leading to 
OIS 3) and may be an example of a group heading towards extinction due to isolation. 
This hypothesis may be confirmed or negated with further DNA analysis of directly 
dated individuals. The broader social relations of Neanderthals likely varied greatly 
depending on environmental conditions. Group sizes of Neanderthals are also likely to 
have been affected by ecological variation. When the carrying capacity of the land 
decreased it is likely that group size also decreased and vice versa. Therefore, I 
believe that in the low resolution record we have of Neanderthal social structure, social 
network, and group size they are likely to have varied greatly in response to 
environmental change, as supported by the regional extinction hypothesis (Eller et al., 
2009; Hublin & Roebroeks, 2009).  
 
Overall, the common consensus is that Neanderthals lived in small group sizes with 
high local residential mobility within limited boundaries (Ambrose, 2010; Churchill, 
2014; Conard et al., 2012; Féblot‐ Augustins, 2009; Finlayson, 2004, pp. 94–134; 
Lieberman & Shea, 1994). Increases in the density of stone tool artefacts from 6.6 to 
17.6 tools per m2 per 1000 years from the Middle Palaeolithic to the Upper Palaeolithic 
have been used to suggest an increase in population density (Mellars & French, 2011). 
However, it may also indicate an increase in sedentism and radiating mobility at sites, 
therefore suggesting a change in subsistence. This was characterized by greater 
specialization in prey and is supported by an increase in storage, bulk harvesting of 
resources, and a change to using tools such as projectile points that are manufactured 
for reliability while performing a specific task rather than maintainability and versatility 
(Churchill & Rhodes, 2009; Churchill, 2009).  
 
Neanderthals largely lacked these changes. There is only evidence of three storage 
pits both of which were absent of bones, and evidence of enamel hypoplasia has been 
used to suggest a lack of winter storage (Churchill, 2014). Although, when directly 
compared, rates of hypoplasia were similar to Inuit groups (Guatelli-Steinberg et al., 
2004). Lack of specialization in hunting can be seen in the faunal assemblages which 
represent the natural ecological distribution of animals (Burke, 2004). Ambrose (2010) 
has even suggested that Neanderthals made unplanned random movements through 
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the landscape reacting opportunistically to encountered resources. Although, this may 
be questioned due to archaeological evidence which shows that they were capable of 
planned seasonal exploitation of recurring resources, as is seen at Jonzac, a site 
characterized by short term seasonal visits to exploit migrating deer (Britton et al., 
2011; Niven et al., 2012). Further, Neanderthals at El Esquilleu are argued to have 
specialized in hunting solitary ibex and chamois in difficult terrain (de los Terreros et 
al., 2014). Hence, while there are still many unanswered questions and disagreements 
regarding Neanderthal mobility and subsistence, the most plausible interpretation is 
that they were likely to have a more structured use of the environment than preceding 
hominins, but were unlikely to have a developed system in the same way as AMH to 
harvest the home range in bulk. 
 
These differences in subsistence strategy have led Finlayson (2004, pp. 94–134) to 
conclude that Neanderthals acted as ‘groups’ merely cooperating to achieve a goal, 
whereas AMH were acting as ‘teams’ with specific tasks and recognition of other’s 
roles. Due to small group sizes many of these features of modernity may not have 
been possible or needed, but it still marks a change in strategy which is often quoted 
as due to cognitive differences. Further, the larger energetic costs of Neanderthals may 
have prohibited large group sizes, aggregations, and the travel needed to maintain an 
extended social network. This may have led to intimate kin-based groups, which may 
have been resistant to external ideas, leading to decreased innovation (Spikins et al., 
2017). From this, it is clear that Neanderthals didn’t put as much emphasis on 
extended sociality as AMH. They lived in smaller group sizes with limited interactions 
with other groups and showed little evidence of social networks. Their subsistence 
strategies were more opportunistic and didn’t require as much forethought, particularly 
when compared to the extensive evidence of Upper Palaeolithic storage (Hoffecker, 
2005). From this we may infer that Neanderthals, a hominin with comparable brain size 
to humans which survived twice as long on earth as we have, evolved along a different 
path to humans. One that may not have put as much emphasis on sociability. 
 
Material culture was greatly affected by this difference in sociality. As stated above, 
Neanderthal material culture was largely static in comparison to AMHs. Compared to 
earlier hominins the Levallois technology of the Neanderthals represented a shift 
towards a more diverse array of tools. This shows that Neanderthals were more 
capable of imitating and maintaining different forms of tool through their cultural history 
(Foley & Lahr, 2003). They produced scrapers, points, notched and denticulated tools, 
blades, and backed knives, as well as continuing to make the highly standardized 
bifacial tools of the Acheulean (Mellars, 1995, pp. 95–140). Evidence of hafted and 
composite tools in the Middle Palaeolithic has been used to suggest that Neanderthals 
were capable of constructive memory and even language (Ambrose, 2010; Rots, 
2013). Therefore, it is clear that Neanderthals show increased complexity 
technologically. Further, contrary to previous assertions (Ambrose, 2001; Mellars, 
1995, pp. 95–140), regional differences in tool shape suggest culturally determined 
imposition of form (Ruebens & Sykes, 2016). Although, tools were less standardized 
than in Upper Palaeolithic contexts (Pastoors & Tafelmaier, 2010). However, 
decreased attention to style in these artefacts may not indicate inferiority. Rather, it has 
been suggested that Levallois technology is ‘incomparably’ more difficult to produce, 
and much more economically efficient (Brantingham & Kuhn, 2001; Eren et al., 2008; 




A further difference is the scarcity of ivory, bone, and antler artefacts (Davies & 
Underdown, 2006; Hoffecker, 2011). Extending psychological work that suggests the 
human mind has multiple domains (or modules) which are specialized for particular 
topics, Mithen (1998, pp. 129–170) has suggested that the Neanderthal mind was 
domain specific. Neanderthals possessed a highly complex knowledge of the social, 
natural, and technical world, however he suggests they were unable to integrate this 
knowledge as they were in separate domains (Mithen, 1996, 2014). In contrast to the 
fluid nature of AMH cognition where modules are able to interact, this caused a number 
of differences. Metaphorical thought wasn’t possible, and as a consequence neither 
was shared visual symbolism; innovation in technology was stinted due to an inability 
to form complex associations, for example between how a tool may relate to the prey 
hunted or to the environmental context in order to produce specialized implements; and 
social developments such as language and consciousness could only be used in a 
social context (Mithen, 1998, pp. 129–170). Mithen has suggested that the lack of 
bone, ivory and antler artefacts is practical evidence of this theory. The materials were 
part of nature and therefore they were unable to be used technologically. This theory 
also accounts for the complexity of Levallois flake production in contrast to a lack of 
tool specialization. However, at Pech de l’Azé and Abri Peyrony bone tools suggested 
to be specialized for removing hides have been found (Soressi et al., 2013). Thus, if 
the Neanderthal mind was modular, the divisions may not have been as clearly defined 
as Mithen suggests, allowing knowledge to permeate into other domains in special 
cases.  
 
This separation of cognitive domains is most visible in the difference between the 
explosive prevalence of AMH and the absence of Neanderthal social material culture. 
AMH are associated with a plethora of symbolic and socially determined artefacts, 
ranging from the standardization of tool form stated above, to the production of beads, 
pendants and ultimately art. In contrast, Neanderthals are associated with the use of 
raptors and corvid feathers (Finlayson et al., 2012; Morin & Laroulandie, 2012), 
pigments (d’Errico et al., 2003; Zilhao, 2012), perforated shells and the highly 
controversial Chatelperronian culture (Zilhao, 2012). The Neanderthal evidence has not 
been universally accepted as evidence of social symbolism. Some researchers believe 
that this is due to a double standard being applied to the evidence (Zilhao, 2012). 
However, as Mithen (2014) has noted, not all decoration is symbolic and may merely 
be to enhance an individual’s or object’s appearance, making them look more attractive 
without any underlying symbolic meaning. Mithen (2014) applied this view to the use of 
pigments, however it is just as easily applied to all of the evidence listed above, 
excluding art. Therefore, unless art that is used to symbolize a form or a meaning is 
found in Neanderthal or even early AMH assemblages it could be concluded that there 
is no evidence for shared symbolic meaning. Furthermore, the use of feathers and 
shells does not contradict the ‘domain specific’ theory, as they were only used scarcely 
for food (Hardy & Moncel, 2011; Pearson, 2007). It is possible that these materials 
were part of the social rather than natural domain. Perhaps Acheulean handaxes and 
the ‘symbolic’ materials of Neanderthals listed above represent individual exceptions 
integrated into the general (cross domain) knowledge of the multi-module theory. This 
would suggest that development towards a domain general brain may have been more 
progressive. Following this evidence, I suggest that the majority of social material 
culture Neanderthals had was largely decorative with no evidence of an underlying 




This conclusion echoes the views of Lewis-Williams (2004, pp. 89–96), that 
Neanderthals may have adopted body decoration but associated it with a different or 
no meaning. Thus, while Neanderthal sociality developed in producing decoration, this 
form of activity can be seen as superficial in contrast to the highly symbolic products of 
art. However, it does represent a change. By using external objects for decoration, 
even if it does not symbolize the hierarchy of a group or any deeper spiritual meaning, 
the social self has been extended to external objects. Items that were previously 
exclusive to other domains have been accepted as socially important. The same may 
be said with the initial standardization of bifaces. Therefore, from the Acheulean 
onward particular objects have been selected which create emotional reactions in 
others and incorporated into the social world. The most probable interpretation is that 
an appreciation for aesthetics implies a level of ToM, as it requires understanding 
other’s views of an object and a shared ascribed value (McNabb, 2012). With the full 
integration of the domains in the Upper Palaeolithic this created a wealth of symbolic 
meaning. With social consequences being implemented in the broader standardization 
of lithic technology. The use of animals and the fusion of animals with people to create 
social or functional symbolic meaning, such as the Trois Frere Sorcerer or the Lion 
Man from Hohlenstein-Stadel. The use of elements of nature symbolically for social 
purposes, such as the early example of Qafzeh 11 who was buried with antler (90-100 
ka BP) or the later Natufian ‘shaman’ burial with 50 tortoise shells (15,000-11,500 BP). 
 
While the differences in Neanderthal cognition severely impacted inventiveness, low 
group size and population density would also have had a significant effect. Horizontal 
transmission (between peers) in Neanderthal groups would be restricted, therefore 
leading to less innovation (Hodgson, 2013; Nakahashi, 2017). When innovation rates 
were modelled to assess reactions to the environment it was found that those in more 
variable locations with uncertain resources consistently invented new subsistence 
methods in hope to find a more efficient way of coping (Pereda et al., 2017). 
Neanderthals were unable to be as reactive to the environment and were more 
vulnerable to extinction events, as is seen by frequent population bottlenecks (Bocquet-
Appel & Degioanni, 2013). Hence, the social complexity of humans greatly impacted 
both their technology and adaptability.   
 
Changes in Brain Structure 
Clearly there were some fundamental neurological differences between Neanderthals 
and AMH. This is interesting because the behavioural evidence explored above 
indicates non-social specialization in Neanderthals, which directly contradicts the social 
theories.  
 
Neanderthals reached similar brain sizes as humans through different non-allometric 
expansions. The three primary areas of differences between Neanderthals and AMHs 
are the visual cortex, parietal cortex, and the overall connectivity of the brain.  
 
Pearce et al. (2013) concluded that Neanderthals had a larger visual cortex and 
therefore had less development in social areas of the brain. However, Holloway (2015) 
has argued that this difference has been exaggerated as differences in face size and 
individual variation wasn’t accounted for when predicting visual cortex size from orbital 
size. Further, the fact that the occipital regions of the brain are larger in Neanderthals 
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may suggest they were better at creating virtual models of objects and the spatial world 
around them when they are not in current view (Langbroek, 2014). I would argue this is 
explicitly seen in the production of Levallois stone tools, where the flake to be removed 
is not as explicitly visible as when producing a blade through reduction. As stated 
above this is a more efficient method of production. Therefore, this is an example of 
divergent technical evolution. 
 
The parietal lobe is considerably different in Neanderthals. Bruner (2010) conducted a 
study into the differences of Homo erectus, Neanderthal and AMH parietal cortices. He 
concluded that relative to Homo erectus, Neanderthals had experienced enlargement 
of the inferior parietal lobe. In contrast, AMH had experienced enlargement of the 
superior parietal lobe. As stated above, an increase in inferior parietal lobe would 
enhance shape recognition, the ability to visualize and plan an operation to produce a 
wanted shape, and possibly ToM. These aspects are all related to creating virtual 
models of an object in the absence of current explicit stimuli. Whereas, the superior 
parietal lobe is related to coding the spatial environment, attentional flexibility, working 
memory and integrating spatial information with past experience to create intentions 
and goals (Bruner, 2010). From this evidence we may further Langbroek’s (2014) 
interpretation that Neanderthals evolved to focus on the virtual and invisible whereas 
humans evolved to focus on the visible and actively produced explicit forms (such as 
art) to understand aspects that may be virtual. However, the connectivity of the 
Neanderthal brain suggests some differences which may have hindered some of these 
abilities and promoted other unique abilities.  
 
Neanderthals are argued to lack a globularization phase during early postnatal brain 
development (Gunz et al., 2010). Although there is new evidence suggesting that 
morphological development and growth rates were similar to humans (Ponce de León 
et al., 2016; Rosas et al., 2017), genetic evidence suggests that human specific 
divergent nucleotides related to neural development caused significant differences in 
behaviour, with mutations in these areas causing psychological conditions today 
(Green et al., 2010). Thus, although there are debates surrounding the nature of 
developmental differences of Neanderthals and humans, it is reasonable to conclude 
that there were differences. I believe these were primarily prenatal, with further 
differences following birth during the globularization phase, and an extended growth 
period overall (Gunz et al., 2010; Ponce de León et al., 2016; Rosas et al., 2017). 
These differences would have had a significant impact on connectivity, thus leading to 
pronounced functional differences. This may have hindered social functions which rely 
on long ranging complex connections, such as ToM, but also created novel 
connections leading to unknown Neanderthal specific skills. 
 
As noted by Hodgson (2013) the cognitive processes investigated above are primarily 
social. The fact that different functions are manifest in Neanderthals may suggest that 
they engaged in a more strictly technical and functional evolution to reduce resource 
expenditure. While there are clear social developments in the form of care for the 
infirm, it must be noted that empathy for pain and personal distress may be heightened 
in individuals with Autism (Rogers et al., 2007). Therefore, the empathetic mechanism 
leading to care for the injured and unwell may develop independent of a neurotypical 
ToM. Neanderthals likely lived a more functionally based life with less of an emphasis 
on outward sociality, as is suggested by the material evidence. In contrast, the 
extensive social networks of AMH led to increases in population inventiveness and 
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collective technological knowledge, and provided mitigation during stressful 
environmental events. Through this, AMH became more adaptable and more 
technologically proficient utilizing an alternate means to Neanderthals. The 
Neanderthal lifestyle was a challenging one, with frequent food shortage and high 
energy budgets. Without a social buffer they likely could not provide the vast energy 
needed for both body and brain growth, leading to an extended period of brain 
development with differences in growth pattern (Gunz et al., 2010; Rosas et al., 2017). 
They therefore didn’t develop the same connections in the brain, which produce the 
social mechanisms of humans. As will be seen in Chapter 4, a slight change in 
development causes differences in modern populations. Therefore, it is possible that 
the more dramatic differences between Neanderthal and human ontogeny would be 
responsible for cognitive differences outside of modern human variability, and perhaps 
a more domain specific mind in Neanderthals. Contrary to theories of sociality, 
Neanderthals likely evolved for strict near-sighted technological efficiency to mitigate 
the difficulties of the climate, through unique technical enhancements. In contrast, AMH 
evolved social buffers which are less efficient but have long term benefits. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
As we can see from the information presented above, areas of the brain specialized for 
sociality developed gradually through time. These likely accentuated methods used for 
behaviour reading, which led to ToM, and enabled more complex social structures and 
relationships. The temporal, parietal, and frontal lobes of Early Homo all expanded thus 
increasing social and lingual capacities. This trend continued in Homo erectus and 
heidelbergensis with the widening of the frontal and temporal lobe as well as a likely 
increase in connection between the frontal, temporal, and parietal lobes all of which 
increase social and ToM abilities. However, following this the human lineage continued 
to develop for large scale socially, whereas the Neanderthal brain developed more for 
other technical functions, such as 3D visualization, to increase efficiency. This shows 
that not all cognitive developments in the hominin lineage have been social. 
 
On the contrary, through the hominin lineage there have been many changes linked to 
technical proficiency. The constant increases in size of the parietal lobe have been 
connected to object manipulation and the ability to impose shape. Increases in 
lateralization of the brain and the size of the Broca’s area are connected to precision 
with tools. Therefore, we may argue that encephalization was also impacted by 
technical pressures.  
 
Lingual abilities have many overlaps with technological abilities. For example, the 
development of the Broca’s area was both for language and action. It is thought that 
this is a general module for processing hierarchical information (Fadiga et al., 2009). 
Developments like this may be seen as both technical and social. Similarly, two other 
areas of the brain activated when producing Oldowan tools are the parietal cortex and 
the medial prefrontal cortex. Both areas involved in ToM. Therefore, areas of the brain 
specialized for technical and social abilities are closely linked. While this may stress 
coevolution, it is important to note that the social functions of the brain are largely 
determined by long range connections, which were likely different in Neanderthals. 
These differences can lead to less socially driven minds. If these differences are 
present in Neanderthals, then the shorter ontogeny and less white matter of earlier 
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hominins would support even more accentuated differences. This suggests even lower 
levels of sociality than is previously suggested from morphological analysis. 
 
Further, due to the disparity between the SBH estimates of Neanderthal group size 
based upon brain size and the estimates based upon archaeological evidence, it can 
be concluded that these estimates are not reliable for both Neanderthals and earlier 
hominins. I believe this shows that there are complicating factors to these estimates, 
this may be the impact of technical pressures on the evolution of the brain. Based upon 
the presented evidence, I conclude that the brain developed to its current form and size 
for multiple reasons. Both social and technical ability were strong pressures for 
encephalization. Thus, contrary to the current focus of research archaeologists must 
broaden their research to explore other pressures of cognitive evolution and not limit 
themselves to defining one cause where there were likely multiple. 
 
Commonly, when a species is under significant conflicting evolutionary pressures, 
individuals vary in how they adapt, and some individuals specialize more for one 
pressure than another (Wilson, 1994). Individuals with Autism Spectrum Condition 
(ASC) are less socially oriented, however they commonly have significant 
accentuations in technical abilities. Therefore, in order to assess the impact of 
conflicting social and technical evolutionary pressures on our species we will use ASC 
as an example of an alternate, more technical, adaptive strategy and investigate what 





Chapter 4: An Evaluation of Conflicting 
Evolutionary Pressures Within Species: A Case 
Study of Autism Spectrum Condition 
This section will explore an alternate, more technical, adaptive strategy within our 
species for coping with the conflicting social and technical pressures - Autism 
Spectrum Condition (ASC). We will explore the social and technical behavioural 
differences associated with the condition, existing archaeological theories of ASC in 
prehistory (4.1), the neurological causes (4.2), and the heritability and genetic causes 
of the condition (4.3). This will enable us to determine whether ASC and its associated 
technical traits may have had an impact on prehistoric groups.  
 
4.1 Behaviour 
Autism Spectrum Condition (ASC) is a collective term used to describe individuals with 
Autism, and individuals who either show only some of the symptoms of Autism or 
milder symptoms. Individuals with ASC are predominantly characterized in the 
literature as having differences in three cognitive functions, Theory of Mind (ToM), 
central coherence - termed Weak Central Coherence (WCC), and executive functions. 
The character of these differences will be explored below. However, individuals with 
autism also have associated technical skills. Individuals may show sensory 
hypersensitivity, high attention to detail, enhanced memory, strict focus on particular 
subjects, and a better understanding of complex systems (Baron-Cohen et al., 2009). 
These differences may lead to many diverse talents, leading Baron-Cohen (2000) to 
conclude that when put in a different, less social environment individuals with high 
functioning Autism or Asperger Syndrome may not be termed ‘disabled’ but may have 
much success. In more extreme cases individuals may show spectacular spontaneous 
talents in drawing, music, and other detail oriented activities.  
 
The behaviour of individuals with Autism will be explored in this section as an example 
of difference. This will focus on differences in the three cognitive functions listed above, 
and will explore enhancements associated with the condition. 
Theory of Mind  
As stated in Chapter 2, ToM is the ability to infer the thoughts and beliefs (mental 
states) of other individuals, measured in levels of intentionality. Individuals with Autism 
have delays in the development of ToM. This was initially shown by Baron-Cohen et al. 
(1985). They conducted a Sally-Anne false belief test assessing level 2 intentionality on 
20 children with Autism between the ages of 6 and 16 using dolls. This showed that 
80% of the children with Autism failed to recognise that Sally held a view alternate to 
reality of where the marble was. In Contrast 85 and 86% of neurotypical and Down-
syndrome individuals passed the test. Although this study was heavily critiqued due to 
the need for imaginative play, the linguistic format of questioning, and whether it was 
strictly tailored to assess the ability to assign false beliefs (de Gelder, 1987), 
subsequent studies accounting for these criticisms have yielded similar results. Leslie 
and Frith (1988) showed that while using real people to act the Sally-Anne test, 
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children with Autism were still less successful than controls. However, this study also 
showed that older children with Autism performed better than younger children. This 
suggests a developmental delay in ToM abilities. 
 
The hypothesis of a developmental delay has been challenged due to conflicting 
results (Perner et al., 1989), however this was further confounded by the large variance 
per study of individuals with ASC being able to pass first order (inferring one other 
person’s mind) ToM tests, which ranged between 15-60% (Happé, 1995). This 
suggests that differences per study were due to small sample sizes. Happé (1995) 
conducted a meta-analysis of 27 different studies to gain a larger sample (N=70). This 
showed that individuals with ASC required a Verbal Mental Age (VMA) above 11-7 to 
pass both the Sally-Anne test and the Smarties test, whereas neurotypical individuals 
could consistently pass both tests with a VMA of 6-9. The conclusion that VMA is 
related to ToM performance is also supported by Philpott et al. (2013) and Yirmiya et 
al. (1996). Sparrevohn and Howie (1995) found a progression in the difficulty of the 
tasks which shows the developmental trajectory of the skill (Table 1). Nevertheless, 
even when the second order false belief test is passed this only represents the ability of 
a neurotypical 6-year-old. Therefore, individuals with ASC may be unable to reach an 
adult level of ToM (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). Further, correct responses may be due 
to individuals using ‘hacking strategies’, where learned associations to specific 
problems are used to work around the problem, rather than inferring an individual’s 
thoughts (Frith et al., 1991; Happé, 1994; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994). Tager-
Flusberg and Joseph (2005) have also shown that an individual’s understanding of 
sentential complements (e.g. asked, said, thought, knew) correlates with success on 
ToM tests. They suggest that sentential complements may be used by individuals with 
ASC to create explicit representations of the issue that allow them to solve the 
problem. Frith et al. (1994) tested this ‘hacking’ hypothesis using the Vineland Adaptive 
Behaviour Scales to assess the use of ToM in real life. If individuals were ‘hacking’ 
then they would not be able to use this method in the more fluid and unpredictable 
everyday life. It was found that only 3 out of 8 autistic individuals who passed first order 
belief tasks showed signs of mentalizing in everyday life. The other 5 individuals 
showed very low use of ToM in an everyday setting and didn’t differ from those who 
failed the tasks. Even those individuals who used ToM in everyday life showed 
differences when compared to other children of their age. This suggests that while 
individuals with ASC may develop to a certain level of ToM there are still difficulties in 
everyday life. This is supported by the research of Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) and 
Happé (1994). By using more adult ToM tests, the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test 
(RMET) and the Strange Stories Test, they showed that individuals with ASC who 
passed previous easier ToM tests made more mistakes than neurotypical individuals in 
these more difficult tests. This shows that although ToM is delayed at reaching the 
neurotypical 6-year-old level, there may still be difficulties on more adult tests and in 
real life.   
 
Differences in ToM may cause difficulties in everyday sociality. For example it may be 
difficult to identify and respond appropriately to other’s emotions, alter conversation 
when in a certain group (e.g. peers) to respond in a way that is ‘cool’ or most accepted, 
understand metaphor and engage in subjective conversation, which leads to a 
preference for objective topics (Ochs & Solomon, 2010). However, it must be 
emphasised that these differences do not lead to an absence of sociality in individuals 





Task Percentage of ASC participants 
successfully passing the test 
Inferred belief - assessing someone's belief 
based upon what they see.  
100% 
Not own belief - understanding an 
individual’s belief when it conflicts with your 
own and false belief is not present. 
83% 
Explicit False Belief - understanding false 
beliefs when explicitly told about them. 
67% 
Smarties task - understanding first order 
false beliefs. 
53% 
Ice cream van test - understanding second 
order false beliefs. 
30% 
     
Table 1. Theory of Mind tasks suggesting a developmental progression (Sparrevohn & 
Howie 1995). 
 
Weak Central Coherence 
WCC entails a difficulty to process information in context. Rather than processing 
information globally, individuals with Autism prefer local, detail based processing. 
Contrary to the name ascribed to this theory no value is attributed to the term ‘weak’. 
Rather it is a term used to suggest reduced central coherence which is affiliated with 
technical advantages and social difficulties (Frith, 2012). Central coherence is 
measured through the use of tests like the homographs test (Frith & Snowling, 1983), 
embedded figures tests (figure 6), and block design tests (figure 7). Through this 
research it has been shown that individuals with ASC are better at identifying 
embedded ‘hidden’ figures within an image (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Shah & 
Frith, 1983), and completing block design tests, which require the reassembly of a 
whole image from components (Shah & Frith, 1993). Although, a recent meta-analysis 
has found that these differences are less extreme than has previously been suggested, 
with less extreme advantages in local processing and disadvantages in global 
processing (Muth et al., 2014). This study also found a high amount of variability in 
individuals’ scores for each test, suggesting high variability in visuo-spatial ability within 
diagnosed individuals.  
 
Research using homograph tests have shown that individuals with ASC have 
difficulties contextualizing the words for meaning (Frith & Snowling, 1983; Happé, 
1997). In everyday conversation WCC may also make it difficult to alter conversation 
based upon the social context (e.g. with peers or adults), understand metaphors in the 
context of the conversation, ensure that replies are directly related to the current topic, 
engage in large complex conversation where previous points must be related to the 
whole (Ochs & Solomon, 2010). Further, WCC has been argued to contribute to 
individual’s difficulties in using ToM in everyday life. This is due to a need to process 
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social information in context to be able to attribute mental states, even when only 
focusing on one detail of a person like in the RMET (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997; 
Frith & Happé, 1994; Jarrold et al., 2000; Skorich et al., 2016). However, this 
hypothesis is contentious with much evidence pointing to the contrary (Happé, 1997). 
For example, it has been found that WCC may be present in the parents and siblings of 
those with ASC, yet these individuals show no social difficulties in their lives (Briskman 
et al., 2001; Happé et al., 2001). This shows two things, firstly that WCC may be 
present without ToM difficulties, and secondly that WCC is a highly heritable trait. Due 
to the conflicting findings on how WCC relates to ToM it is perhaps better to conclude 
that while WCC can cause further difficulties in inferring another’s mind it is not 
necessarily a determinant (Happé, 1999).   
 
As stated above WCC can lead to many technical assets. Local processing bias has 
been associated with enhanced musical talent and talent in art. The former is due to 
the ability of individuals with ASC to learn the labels of musical notes and acquire 
perfect pitch (Heaton et al., 1998). The latter is due to the construction of drawings by 
reproducing particular details rather than whole forms. This is seen in the artwork of 
Nadia and Jamie, who will be further explored below, and also individuals such as 
Stephen Wiltshire and Peter Myers who have received acclaim for their work. Baron-
Cohen (2002) suggests that local detail processing may be used to understand 
complex systems. He states that individuals with ASC start by processing information 
locally to see whether independent features may fit together into a system. By 
understanding the particularities of the system in relation to how finite parts interact, the 
entire system may be understood more fully. This may account for restricted and 
repetitive interests, but it also explains the increased aptitude for maths, science, and 
engineering. Further, a focus on producing systems may be a causal factor for 
decreased global processing as contextual information is harder to systemize (Baron-
Cohen, 2006).  
 
Grandin (2006) has revealed that she thinks in pictures. She has used this visualization 
of detail to become a very successful livestock equipment designer. She states that 
she is able to visualize the point of view of the cattle to help define details that might 
frighten them. Further, she can test-run her designs using her imagination as if it were 
a videotape piecing together the details to create the ‘new whole’. This is a skill which 
utilized local detail processing and a systematic mind in an effective way. Clearly this 
cognitive style may produce exceptional, functional, and culturally valued talent.  
 
These cognitive styles of local processing and systemizing are prevalent in the wider 
population as well as in those with ASC and represents a normal distribution (Happé, 
1999). The relations this cognitive style has with exceptional talent will be explored 





Figure 6. Example of an Embedded Figure, where the image of the ‘hidden house’ 
must be found within the horse. 
 
 
Figure 7. An example of a block design test, where the blocks on the right must be 
arranged to produce the image on the left. 
 
Executive Functions 
Executive functions are abilities for problem solving used to achieve a future goal or 
intention. These include planning, impulse control, inhibition, working memory, task 
switching and monitoring of action, and require the individual to detach themselves 
from the world around them. 
 
Individuals with ASC have shown difficulty with harder versions of the Tower of Hanoi 
and Trail Making B test, tests which requires high levels of planning (Kleinhans et al., 
2005). This is likely in part due to difficulties with mental flexibility, as shown by results 
on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, where participants with ASC often struggle to 
adapt to a new rule. Further differences are that individuals with ASC are less likely to 
suppress prepotent responses, less likely to spontaneously generate pretence and may 
have difficulty monitoring their own actions and thoughts, although evidence for this is 
tenuous (Hill, 2004, 2004). These differences may lead to more rigid behaviour, narrow 
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interests, and perseverations (Ozonoff et al., 1991). As seen there are difficulties 
associated with this trait. However, having a narrow interest may be an asset in 
particular contexts. For example, Baron-Cohen (2008) states that individuals with ASC 
may use their narrow focus to check and recheck systems and gain pleasure from 
doing so, this would be interpreted as a perseveration. These ‘obsessions’ focus on 
folk physics and thus cause an enhancement in folk physics. Within settings such as 
scientific higher education, or careers such as engineering, this would be an asset 
(Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 1999).  
 
Further, similar to the findings of WCC, parents of those with ASC are also liable to 
have similar executive differences (Piven & Palmer, 1997). It is likely that abilities in 
executive functions are also normally distributed through the population. ASC is merely 
an extreme, which leads to some difficulties but also advantages, and similar to WCC 
can lead to success.  
 
Spikins, Wright and I have also explored how individuals with ASC relate to objects 
(Spikins et al., 2017). This involved asking several questions about disaster scenarios, 
such as what they would take if there was a fire at work, home or they were stranded 
on a desert island. We found that rather than taking sentimental objects that remind 
them of relationships and past events, they were more likely to take functional objects. 
Therefore, during these theoretical disasters those with an AQ score above the 
threshold which suggests an ASC are more practical and have more selectively 
advantageous responses. In a past where how a disaster is managed could mean life 
or death the selection of functional objects rather than a predilection towards 
sentimental objects was likely a highly advantageous asset.   
 
Archaeological Interpretations 
The differences outlined above have begun to be integrated into theories of prehistoric 
groups, as discussed by Spikins, Scott and Wright (in press). The extensive 
observations of Nadia, a child with Autism who possessed extraordinary drawing 
abilities early in life, by Selfe (1977), were reinterpreted by Humphrey (1998) to explore 
the similarities between the child’s art and ice age cave art (figure 8). Humphrey 
suggests that there is an intense naturalism in both Nadia’s and the cave artists’ works, 
which doesn’t adhere to stereotypes of an image, but rather are depictions of the 
singular animal. The outline of the animals are depicted by Nadia as single linear lines 
with similar methods of producing perspective as the cave artists. Further similarities 
are a preference for a side on view, need for exceptional memory, emphasis on the 
faces and feet of the animals, overlapping of figures and the creation of composite 
animals. These similarities are striking, however Humphrey focused on Nadia’s lack of 
language suggesting that the creators of cave art may not have had language to 
categorize or name animals therefore paintings were based on the actual forms rather 
than stereotyped mental images of the named category (e.g. horse). Humphrey argues 
that this is what has led to the highly detailed images in the caves. Mithen comments 
within the paper that the idea that language is not necessary for the production of these 
images is interesting as it breaks an assumption that underlies much work on 
Palaeolithic art. However, he states that due to the universality of language, and the 
continuity of the archaeological record, language must have evolved at least 100 ka. 




Kellman (1998) took a different perspective to Humphrey, suggesting that aspects of 
visual processing rather than a lack of categorization of images through language was 
the key connection. She suggests that the ability to think in pictures, as Grandin is able 
to do, may be responsible for the high attention to detail and other commonalities seen 
in both cave art and the art of individuals with ASC. According to this theory the 
meaning of the artwork is to order the world around them, their own thoughts, and 
interests in a visual way, or to put that another way - to systemize them.  
 
Spikins (2009) takes a different stance on this debate. Rather than there being 
similarities between the minds of those who created cave art and individuals with ASC, 
she states that individuals with autistic traits may have influenced the way that 
individuals around them thought. Spikins also extended the theory to suggest that the 
high attention to detail needed to produce microliths would favour an autistic mindset 
and that the transition to a modern mind may in fact be the transition to the inclusion of 
different minds. This theory of integration was recently extended by Spikins et al. 
(2016). They suggest that the emergence of collaborative morality led to conditions 
where an individual’s vulnerabilities could be buffered, and specialized talents could be 
recognized and utilized more effectively. Asperger syndrome is suggested as a 
condition with assets which may have been integrated, valued, and had a significant 
impact on the success of a group. Spikins and Wright (2016) further explored this 
subject suggesting that beyond art the recording of natural systems would favour an 
autistic mindset. For example, at Abauntz Cave (13,660 ka) Maps were produced 
which depict rivers, flooded areas, mountains, entrance to a cave and the location to 
ford the river. These depictions are haphazardly organized with overlying and 
underlying animal depictions (Utrilla et al., 2009). A second example used by Spikins 
and Wright (2016) is the Abri Blanchard plaquette, which depicts the position and 
phase of the moon using a coordinate system. They argue that these forms of 
recordings are characteristic of many individuals with ASC. However, rather than 
suggesting that it is individuals with ASC producing these items, they suggest that it is 
the autistic vision, or traits of Autism which are responsible for these products. This is 
an important differentiation because ASC would have been uncommon and, as shown 
above, the traits of Autism may be distributed through the population. Therefore, the 
technical traits of Autism, and the influence of individuals with these traits on those 




Figure 8. Comparison of horses by Nadia 3 years 5 months (Selfe 1977), and the 




This theory is not without opposition. Pickard et al. (2011) and Bednarik (2013, 2016) 
have each presented counter arguments. Pickard et al. (2011) regard ASC as a 
deleterious pathological by-product of human variation, and believe that even if 
individuals with the condition were integrated they would not have significantly 
influenced groups to produce advantages. Further he suggests that it takes 
considerable therapy to encourage the creativity of individuals with Autism, which is 
unlikely to have occurred during the Palaeolithic. Therefore, they are unlikely to be the 
producers of Palaeolithic art. They suggest psychotropic drugs as an alternative. 
Pickard et al. also refute Spikins’ (2009) assertion that individuals with ASC may have 
provided the mindset for an insight into the natural systems of animals and the 
weather. They state that WCC would inhibit the processing of these systems which 
would require global processing. There are several issues with Pickard et al.’s 
arguments. Firstly, new genetic evidence which will be explored below (3.3) directly 
refute the idea of ASC as a deleterious phenomenon. Secondly, the use of psychedelic 
drugs changes sensory experience, but it does not lead to accurate and realistic artistic 
ability (Spikins, Scott and Wright in press). Thirdly, the suggestion that individuals with 
ASC would not be able to provide an insight into the natural systems of the landscape 
directly contrasts with the psychological literature (see above). Bednarik (2013, 2016) 
shares Pickard et al.’s view that ASC is a deleterious by-product. He suggests that the 
social difficulties of individuals with ASC would lead to negative selection and that the 
recent prevalence is due to a suspension of natural selection. Bednarik also suggests 
that the rigidity of the mind of individuals with ASC would prevent innovative thought. 
However, as shown above the mindset of individuals with ASC may actually lead to 
success in innovative professions, as shown by Grandin (2006). Bednarik suggests 
that trance states may be an alternative. However, as stated above, while an altered 
state of consciousness may lead to decreased inhibitions and an increase in the 
production of art, it does not lead to spontaneous talent (Spikins, Scott and Wright in 
press). 
 
The behaviour and cognition of individuals with ASC produce many technical 
advantages to compensate for social difficulties. These advantages range from 
increased detail processing, systemizing, and having an intense focus upon narrow 
interests, to selecting more functional items during a crisis.  
 
We will now briefly explore the neurological causes of these differences and then 
assess whether the genetic literature supports the assertions of Bednarik and Pickard. 




The Neurological causes of ASC are currently unclear. However, there are a significant 
number of differences suggested as causal. Primarily it is accepted that atypical neural 
connections are responsible for at least some of the behavioural differences of 
individuals with ASC. Long range underconnectivity has been found across the brain, 
with local overconnectivity in particular areas. Both areas of over and under 
connectivity are correlated with the strength of behavioural differences (Kana et al., 
2014; Maximo et al., 2014). However, due to the wide range of connective differences 
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seen, it is difficult to identify patterns in these difference (Maximo et al., 2014). 
Conflicting results further confuse this.  
 
Aberrant connectivity in individuals with ASC is most likely caused by developmental 
differences. Individuals with Autism on average have a larger brain size than controls at 
the age of 2-4. Estimates of the difference vary widely most probably due to individual 
variation within samples which effect averages between samples. One estimate is that 
individuals with Autism have a brain size 18% larger than controls. This is suggested to 
be due to greater neuronal growth or less pruning, which is likely responsible for 
differences in connectivity (Penn, 2006). However, when put into a developmental 
frame, individuals with Autism show increased connectivity during childhood, followed 
by reduced connectivity in adolescence and adulthood, therefore these studies need to 
be contextualized with age (Uddin et al., 2013). This may help to reduce conflicting 
results and elucidate a pattern. The current view held by neurologists is that there is an 
increase in local connectivity and a decrease in global connectivity in the brain. 
Therefore, there are areas of hyper-connectivity, such as the frontal lobe, yet these 
areas are not as connected to other components which are highly intra-connected 
(Courchesne & Pierce, 2005). Connective differences are also apparent in individuals 
with milder forms of ASC. However, connective differences may vary depending on the 
phenotype of the condition. This is shown by connective differences in the left 
hemisphere of individuals with Asperger Syndrome relative to individuals with Autism, 
which facilitate the acquisition of language (Duffy et al., 2013). Thus, we can conclude 
that there are connective differences in individuals with ASC, but must acknowledge 
that there is also high individual variability. 
 
Penn (2006) provided an extensive review of the likely neurological causes of Autism 
(table 2). This highlights how widespread the differences are. However, it must also be 
noted that conflicting results are rife within this research. What is clear is that there are 
morphological as well as connective difference, which may be correlated to the degree 
of symptoms and phenotype of the condition (Schumann et al., 2009). Due to the 
discrepancies between research teams it may be possible that individual variation 
within groups with ASC has more of an impact than is currently accepted. 
Nevertheless, it is clear from this that the developmental differences of individuals with 
ASC has an impact on the morphology of components of the brain. The microstructure 
of the brain also appears to have differences. Minicolumns, the smallest level of 
organisation in the brain (Buxhoeveden & Casanova, 2002), are more numerous, but 
smaller with less compact cells (Casanova et al., 2002). This is argued to be a factor 
contributing to the differences in connectivity.   
   
 
Cortical difference Likely Effects 
Cerebellum - difference in volume and 
activation. 
Differences in shifting and orienting 
attention. 
Temporal lobe - overconnectivity in medial 
temporal lobe, atypical activation of the 
temporal poles, increased activation of 
Wernick’s area during sentence 
comprehension, larger size of the 
Differences in lingual abilities, facial 
processing, ToM, cross modal association, 
and central coherence. 
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amygdala, little or no activation in the 
amygdala and fusiform gyrus when inferring 
emotion. 
Frontal lobe - Abnormal activation during 
ToM tasks, less activation of the right 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, posterior 
cingulate cortex, parietal cortex and 
increased occipitotemporal activation during 
embedded figures tests, WCC suggests 
decreased connection with other cortices.  
Highly connected with the triad of Autism 
symptoms, difficulty with ToM, executive 
functions, and central coherence. 
    
Table 2. The differences in the brain identified by Penn’s (2006) review. 
      
There are two further neurological difference in ASC. Differences in von Economo 
Neurons (VENs) and Mirror Neurons. VENs are argued to be more numerous, have 
morphological differences, and be absent within a dimple in the right fronto insular 
cortex (rFIC) in individuals with Autism (Santos et al., 2011). VENs rapidly relay simple 
information processed in the FIC and the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) to the frontal 
and temporal cortices where slower judgements are made (Allman et al., 2005). The 
impact of these differences was shown by Baron-Cohen et al. (1999), who showed that 
the rFIC was significantly less active when inferring mental states from pictures. The 
developmental history of VENs also supports their importance for social interaction, 
with their completion of growth coinciding with the development of first order ToM at the 
age of 4 (Allman et al., 2005). These neurons seem imperative for the fast, intuitive 
decision making needed for ToM. It is also suggested by Butti et al. (2013) that 
different variations of VENs may be responsible for different subgroups of ASC. Allman 
and Mareschal (2016) recently proposed that mental time travel is the mechanism 
leading to ToM development and that VENs may be the mechanism allowing this 
disassociation with the present. However, more research is needed to firmly determine 
the impact of VENs on ToM due to the small sample sizes and the inability to directly 
study these neurons in vivo. Sridharan et al. (2008) have also displayed that the rFIC 
and ACC may be imperative for executive functions, as they play a causal role in 
switching from the default mode networks to the central executive networks. This is 
supported by the work of Hodgson et al. (2007) which showed that individuals with 
lesions on the rFIC had difficulties with rule switching and antisaccade tasks. 
Therefore, VENs may be significant for executive functions. Disorganisation or reduced 
connectivity in the right side of the brain has long been implicated in disrupting global 
processing (Happé, 1999; Melillo & Leisman, 2009). The FIC has also been found to be 
sensitive to sublexical pronunciation, which is reliant on the dorsal (global processing) 
stream (Borowsky et al., 2006). Therefore, it may be posited for future research that the 
different organization of VENs may impact central coherence. Thus, VENs may be an 
example of long ranging, fast acting connections that have been impacted by the 
developmental differences of individuals with ASC, and likely are partially culpable for 
the triad of symptoms. 
 
The Mirror Neuron System (MNS) has also been implicated in difficulties with ToM 
(Ramachandran & Oberman, 2006). Mirror neurons have been predominantly located 
in the premotor cortex, posterior parietal cortex and inferior frontal gyrus, although they 
have also been found in areas such as the insular cortex and ACC (Caruana et al., 
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2017; Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Ramachandran & Oberman, 2006). The MNS is 
related to imitation, goal understanding and empathy (Rizzolatti et al., 2001). In 
Neurotypical individuals mirror neurons activate when performing an action, however 
they also activate when observing another person perform an action, this elicits similar 
motor evoked potentials to the person performing the action (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; 
Gallese et al., 1996). This is thought to be essential for representing other’s minds 
(Gallese & Goldman, 1998). However, mirror neuron activation during observation 
tasks and the cortical thickness of MNS associated areas are negatively correlated with 
AQ (Dapretto et al., 2006; Hadjikhani et al., 2006; Martineau et al., 2010; Oberman et 
al., 2005; Puzzo et al., 2010; Ramachandran & Oberman, 2006). It is suggested that 
this contributes to the social differences of individuals with ASC. However, this is 
debated (Gallese et al., 2011). A brief meta-analysis of studies between 2008 and 2013 
shows that 76% support the impact of mirror neurons on social cognition in Autism 
(Neta & Varanda, 2016). While it is not currently understood whether this is causative 
or derivative, statements of how this may aid treatment imply that it is a cause 
(Ramachandran & Oberman, 2006). Functionally, it has been argued that this causes 
difficulties in the social understanding of intentions, emotional empathy, and imitation.  
It must be noted that this mirror neuron response is automatic to another’s actions or 
emotions, which is unconscious and simulatory; therefore, it doesn’t represent or 
prevent conscious appraisal of another individual's actions or emotions (Gallese et al., 
2007). This division has been demonstrated by McIntosh et al. (2006) who showed that 
while individuals with ASC do not have automatic imitation responses they may have 
voluntary conscious responses when prompted. This may be consistent with the 
‘hacking strategies’ outlined above and suggests that individuals with ASC are reliant 
on a conscious ‘theory theory’ (constructed through causal laws) rather than an 
unconscious ‘simulation theory’ (where another person’s mindset is adopted) utilizing 
the MNS (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). This may also account for studies such as 
Hamilton et al. (2007) where individuals are overtly prompted to imitate, which negate 
the MNS hypothesis. Further it has recently been shown that motor imitation is intact 
despite difficulties with empathetic emotional simulation (Schulte-Rüther et al., 2017).  
 
I am aware that this section largely has focused on the difficulties of individuals with 
ASC. This is due to the current focus of the literature on identifying methods of 
treatment for these difficulties. Nevertheless, many of the differences referenced in this 
section may be equally viewed in the manner of the previous section, as producing 
assets as well as the commonly cited difficulties. For example, the increased local 
connectivity of the brain may be responsible for certain talents associated with ASC 
due to accentuation of domains rather than general integration. One example of this 
may be the increased intra-connectivity of the frontal lobe. While the different 
connection may be responsible for some executive difficulties it may enhance other, 
such as memory. Additionally, the differences in connectivity of the right hemisphere 
increase the use of the ventral stream (for local processing). Hence, the connective 
differences may also be responsible for increased attention to detail and analytical 
ability. This has also been shown to account for acoustic hypersensitivity, with early left 
temporal and frontal lobe activation in individuals with Autism. This increases the 
likelihood of developing perfect pitch and extraordinary musical ability and may account 
for the high rates of enhanced perceptual abilities (58%) and domain specific skills 
(62.5%) seen in individuals with Autism (Meilleur et al., 2015). Further, due to the fact 
that imitation of motor action is not inhibited it can be concluded that, in a prehistoric as 
57 
 
well as modern context, individuals with ASC would have been able to utilize the larger 
social group sizes to learn complex tool production skills.  
 
It is interesting to observe that this is a condition which leads to social differences and 
often difficulties, but enhances technical abilities. If the genetics that cause this 
condition are positively selected for, and there is significant heritability, then I believe 
this is an alternative cognitive style responding to the conflicting social and technical 
pressures active upon our species, which focuses on technical ability. Additionally, this 
is a condition which causes significant behavioural differences which would be invisible 
when assessing archaeological cranial remains. This highlights just how fragmented 
the record presented in Chapter 3 may be. Autism causes minimal morphological 
difference in the brain which would not be observable in the archaeological record. 
However, it leads to a considerably different social life, with much more emphasis on 
objects and systems. Therefore, a key question which should be considered in future 
research is how much of an impact changes in connectivity could have had during 
human evolution? A further question to be posed is, could the changes in morphology 
of the brain have occurred for different functional reasons and then their ultimate nature 
was changed as connections developed between areas, leading to more social or 
different functioning? If so then there is a considerable gap in our ability to assess the 




The genetic mechanisms causing autism are poorly understood. However, it is 
considered a highly heritable condition. This was initially shown by Folstein and Rutter 
(1977), who found a concordance of 36% between monozygotic (MZ: N=11) twins 
compared to 0% between dizygotic (DZ: N=10) twins for strict Autism. They also 
showed high concordance rates for other social differences, 82% and 10% for MZ and 
DZ twins. This led them to conclude that Autism is highly heritable, through the 
transmission of a broad range of hereditary social and lingual abnormalities which may 
interact with other genetic and environmental factors to cause Autism. As a 
consequence, a broader autism phenotype (BAP) was defined, where individuals show 
similarities to those with Autism. Concordance estimates for BAP were as high as 92% 
for MZ twins, however, for DZ twins concordance remained as low as 10%. Based 
upon these results the heritability of the condition was estimated between 91-93% 
(Bailey et al., 1995).   
 
More recent estimates of concordance range between 39-94.7% and 15-31% for MZ 
and DZ twins (Huguet et al., 2016; Lichtenstein et al., 2010; Ronald & Hoekstra, 2011; 
Rosenberg et al., 2009; Taniai et al., 2008). Modern heritability estimates also have a 
broad range, between 38-80% for ASC (Hallmayer et al., 2011; Huguet et al., 2016; 
Lichtenstein et al., 2010; Sandin et al., 2014). This is likely due to the small sample 
sizes used in these studies, which may be composed of different types of twins. 
Hallmayer et al. (2011) have shown that there are differences in concordance between 
different types of twins (table 3). They argue that this may be the impact of non-shared 
environmental factors. Hence, if a study is composed of a high proportion of sex 
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discordant twins with male probands heritability estimates will be lower. Differences 
such as this may be responsible for the high variation seen in estimates based upon 
twin studies.  
 
 
Type of twin Concordance for strict 
autism 
Concordance for ASC 
Monozygotic males  58% (N=40) 77% (N=45) 
Monozygotic females  60% (N=7) 50% (N=9) 
Dizygotic males  21% (N=31) 31% (N=45) 
Dizygotic females 27% (N=10) 36% (N=13) 
Dizygotic female co-twin of 
male proband 
3.7% (N=54) 5.3% (N=76) 
Dizygotic male co-twin of 
female proband 
50% (N=2) 50% (N=6) 
        
Table 3. Differences in concurrence between types of twins (Hallmayer et al. 2011). 
 
The rates of recurrence in siblings also suggest high heritability. If a family has a single 
child with an ASC, then there is a 25% chance that a second child will also have an 
ASC. If a family has two or more children with ASC, then the third sibling is 50% likely 
to have an ASC (Ozonoff et al., 2011). Sandin et al. (2014) produced a study of 
2,049,973 children, which showed that a person's risk of having ASC or Autism 
increased with relatedness to an affected proband. Heritability was estimated at 50%, 
with the largest causes being additive genetics and non-shared environmental factors. 
This is the largest study of familial risk to date, therefore making it less susceptible to 
sampling issues than small scale twin studies. 
 
The heritability of autistic traits has also been assessed in the wider population. 
Heritability estimates range between 36-87%. However, there is a clear reporter bias, 
with these estimates being more modest when self-reported (36-57%) and more 
extreme when reported by a teacher or parent (60-90%). Heritability estimates are 
lower when younger children are rated by teachers or parents (40-44%). This contrasts 
with the reporter bias and suggests that heritability increases with age (Ronald & 
Hoekstra, 2011).  
 
It can be seen that ASC and autistic traits are highly heritable. Therefore, it must have 
an evolutionary history and an evolutionary impact. To fully understand this 
evolutionary impact the genetic architecture of ASC must be explored. 
 
Genetic Causes 
Genetically, three different mechanisms may cause Autism: single nucleotide 




SNPs are a difference in a single nucleotide in the DNA sequence which is common 
across 1% of the population. This causes common variation. It is estimated that 
common variation such as this contributed to at least 25% of liability for ASC (Cross-
Disorder Group of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium et al., 2013; Gaugler et al., 
2014; Klei et al., 2012; Robinson et al., 2016). Klei et al. (2012) have suggested that 
this contribution may vary between simplex (40%) and multiplex (60%) families. 
However, it has been argued that even the most associated SNPs have a small effect 
(El-Fishawy & State, 2010). Consequently, individually SNPs have low penetrance, but 
additively they may have a high impact and be responsible for up to 95% of the 
heritability of ASC (Gaugler et al., 2014; Huguet et al., 2016). This supports the 
assortative mating hypothesis and the spectral view of Autism (Baron-Cohen, 2006; 
Ronald & Hoekstra, 2011). Nevertheless, due to the low penetrance and how 
numerous (>1000) SNPs are, no causative polymorphism has been found; even the 
most significant (CNTNAP2) only has a modest effect (Anney et al., 2012; Arking et al., 
2008; Huguet et al., 2016; Warrier et al., 2015). 
 
Evolutionarily, these findings support the Common Disease Common Variant (CDCV) 
hypothesis. CDCV predicts that common genetic diseases (affect >1% of the 
population) must stem from common SNPs. Due to our species expanding to our 
current population in just 100,000 years from an original populace of 10,000, it is 
thought that the original population couldn’t have supported a large amount of disease 
alleles. Rapid expansion meant that new mutations and rare mutations didn’t have time 
to become prolific. Therefore, common diseases are caused by the same common 
variants as 100,000 years ago. This suggests that these risk alleles aren’t selected out 
by evolution. In the case of polygenic conditions such as autism, this may be the case 
as each individual polymorphism carries low risk and has associated advantages (El-
Fishawy & State, 2010; Pickard et al., 2011). For example, Polimanti and Gelernter 
(2017) have shown that SNPs associated with Autism are under positive selection due 
to their functional relationship with neurogenesis and cognition. Therefore, a highly 
heritable phenotype of ASC may have been present in prehistory prior to 100 ka with at 
least milder traits and phenotypes under positive selection.    
 
CNVs are microdeletions and microduplications within the genome. They are 
significantly associated with ASC, seen in 5-11.6% of cases in contrast to 1% of 
controls. De novo CNVs are more prevalent in probands of simplex (7-10%) than 
multiplex (2-3%) families (Christian et al., 2008; Colosimo, 2010; Cook & Scherer, 
2008; Devlin & Scherer, 2012; Marshall et al., 2008; Pinto et al., 2010; Sebat et al., 
2007; Zhao et al., 2007). This difference is due to de novo CNVs becoming inherited 
variants. Transmission is estimated at 50%, with 40% coming from non-ASC parents, 
most likely females (Cook & Scherer, 2008; Devlin & Scherer, 2012; Zhao et al., 2007). 
However, even when siblings are concordant for ASC they may be discordant for a 
specific inherited CNV. This suggests that CNVs interact with other genetic and 
environmental factors and may not be causative on their own. Further, CNVs are 
complicit in causing more severe phenotypes of ASC. De novo CNVs target networks 
related to synapse development, axon targeting and neuronal motility, often causing 
lower IQ and even intellectual disability (Gilman et al., 2011; Leppa et al., 2016; Pinto 
et al., 2010). I believe this suggests that different genetic causes underlie high and low 
functioning ASC. This echoes de la Torre-Ubieta et al.’s (2016) interpretation that the 
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genetic evidence suggests that ASC is not only comprised of one condition, but a 
number of genetically distinct conditions which cause similar behaviour.  
 
A number of CNVs implicated in ASCs have a recent evolutionary history, developing 
following the divergence from Neanderthals approximately 588 ka (Mendez et al., 
2016). CNVs at 16p11.2 account for 1% of autism. These are caused by a duplication 
that occurred at BOLA2 specifically in humans 282ka which was strongly selected for 
due to its function in iron regulation during embryonic development. However, this 
duplication caused instability within chromosome 16p11.2 and led to an increased 
susceptibility to CNVs (Nuttle et al., 2016). AUTs2 is the genomic region that most 
differentiates humans and Neanderthals. CNVs and deletions in this region are 
significantly associated with Autism and a number of other neurological conditions 
(Oksenberg & Ahituv, 2013; Oksenberg et al., 2013). Dosage of DUF1220 has been 
shown to correlate with 3 major symptoms of autism: social differences, communicative 
difficulties, and repetitive behaviour (Davis et al., 2014). CNVs within or near DUF1220 
domains have also been related to brain size and the number of domains have been 
shown to increase linearly with relation to humans (e.g. Number of domains: 
Human=212, Chimpanzee=34, Macaque=30, Mouse=1). Suggesting it has been under 
recent positive selection. However, by allowing such a rapid increase in the copy 
number of DUF1220, it has led to instability in 1q21.1 (where most DUF1220 
sequences map), and created an increased susceptibility to autism (Dumas & Sikela, 
2009). Therefore, DUF1220 has two affects: (1) it increases instability in 1q21.1 leading 
to more disadvantageous CNVs, (2) dosage of DUF1220 itself directly influences 
autistic traits. Similarly, chromosome 15q13.3 has become unstable due to large 
expansion between 500-900ka (Antonacci et al., 2014).  
 
Rare de novo point mutations occur in two ways, through causing loss of function 
(LOF) or missense (which causes it to function differently, for example coding for a 
different amino acid). Iossifov et al. (2014) have shown that missense mutations have 
little effect on autism, only occurring marginally more often in ASC patients (rate: 
ASC=0.94; control = 0.82), this means that when observed they are only 12% likely to 
influence ASC diagnosis. Similarly, they have very little impact on heritability, 0.04%. 
Whereas, LOF mutations have a much higher impact with 43% of LOF mutations 
contributing to 9% of diagnosis and 1.11% of heritability (Gaugler et al., 2014; Iossifov 
et al., 2014). Due to their higher impact, functional analysis will focus on LOF 
mutations. 
 
LOF mutations associated with ASC have been significantly associated with intellectual 
disability (ID) and lower IQ as they are often in areas linked to synaptic transmission, 
neuronal development, axon guidance, and fragile X mental retardation protein (De 
Rubeis et al., 2014; Iossifov et al., 2014; Robinson et al., 2016; Ronald & Hoekstra, 
2011; Ronemus et al., 2014). Ronald and Hoekstra (2011) argue that this may be a key 
difference between individuals with comorbid ID and those without ID. Similarly, 
Warrier et al. (2016) have shown an increase in de novo missense and LOF mutations 
in areas also enriched for genes associated with educational attainment, with larger 
mutations causing more severe phenotypes and smaller mutations leading to talents. 
 
These findings suggest that while 31% of individuals with ASC have comorbid ID, it is 
largely due to de novo LOF, missense, and CNV mutations with low prevalence and 
(excluding CNVs) heritability (Leppa et al., 2016). Thus, similar to de la Torre-Ubieta et 
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al. (2016), I suggest that there are at least two genetically distinct phenotypes of ASC. 
One associated with ID caused by de novo mutation, the other caused by common 
variants under positive selection. It must be recognised that de novo mutations are not 
human specific. For example, a Japanese macaque was found to exhibit autistic traits 
and had 2 CNVs and 32 LOFs (Yoshida et al., 2016). However, the increased 
susceptibility to these mutations has been shown to be evolutionarily recent 
(Tennessen et al., 2012). 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
In this section we have assessed the behaviour, neurology, and genetics of individuals 
with ASC. From this we can make a series of conclusions.  
 
Firstly, ASC is a condition which is associated with many technical assets as well as 
social difficulties, many of which would have been highly advantageous in prehistoric 
hunter-gatherer societies. Further, many of the behavioural traits of individuals with 
ASC are normally distributed through the population (4.1). 
 
Secondly, the neurological differences of individuals with ASC, although unclear, are 
largely connective with only minor differences in cerebral morphology. These 
differences would be invisible in the archaeological record, yet they cause considerable 
behavioural and cognitive differences. This raises the question of how much of an 
impact differences in connectivity would have had in human evolution and whether 
changes in the morphology of the brain through time could have occurred for different 
reasons, with their modern social nature forming later through changes in connectivity. 
This would leave a considerable gap in our ability to assess the evolution of the human 
mind (4.2). 
 
Thirdly, ASC and autistic traits are highly heritable, with the majority of heritability being 
due to SNPs which are under positive selection. Conversely, CNVs have been shown 
to be a rarer cause of ASC despite being highly heritable. De novo causes of ASC are 
consistent with ID. Due to their lower prevalence in multiplex families and (excluding 
CNVs) lower heritability it is suggested that this represents a different genetic 
mechanism. This de novo mechanism is largely recent, with a different evolutionary 
history to causative SNPs. This suggests that phenotypes comorbid with ID are largely 
unrelated to ASC without ID and are under different evolutionary selection. Therefore, 
while ASC with ID is likely to have become prevalent specifically in modern humans 
following 200ka, due to increased genetic instability, ASC without ID was present prior 
to 200ka and under positive selection (4.3). 
 
This suggests that ASC without ID is an alternate adaptive strategy which significantly 
enhances technical ability, at the expense of social abilities, and was present prior to 
200ka.   
 
As explored above Autism is made up of multiple traits that are normally distributed 
through the population. To assess the impact of an autistic way of thinking on the past 
we will now focus on one trait - detail focus - and assess how this trait may have 




Chapter 5: Detail Focus - An Archaeological 
Application 
 
This section presents an experimental case study which tests the hypothesis that 
characteristics and components of autism would influence individuals’ 
engagement with material culture, in particular art. With the assistance of Penny 
Spikins and Barry Wright, I created the Visual Perception and Cognition Survey, which 
was completed by 1027 participants. This showed that individuals with the technical 
autistic trait ‘high attention to detail’ were more susceptible to pareidolic illusions. 
Pareidolic illusions have been suggested as a stimulant for the production of 
Palaeolithic art. Thus, the hypothesis was supported. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As we have previously explored in section 4.1 detail focus or WCC is a key 
characteristic of ASC. This leads to many technical assets such as a more systematic 
mind, more realistic depictions from memory, and an enhanced ability to identify 
embedded figures. This investigation focuses on the final two abilities. 
 
There has been extensive debate about the similarities between Palaeolithic art and 
the art of individuals with Autism, which has led researchers to suggest that individuals 
with autistic traits may have produced Palaeolithic art (4.1). This hypothesis has been 
criticized for several reasons. Firstly, it has been argued that ASC is a deleterious by-
product of rapid neural evolution and that this is unlikely to have significantly influenced 
groups. Secondly, a large criticism is the difficulty to gain empirical evidence for this 
theory (Bednarik, 2013, 2016; Pickard et al., 2011). The first criticism is rectified in the 
previous section, as it has been shown that, while ASC with ID has increased in 
prevalence due to greater genetic instability following rapid encephalization, ASC 
without ID is a product of common variation caused by SNPs. This suggests that ASC 
without ID has a different genetic cause and a longer evolutionary history. Further, it is 
supported by the distribution of autistic traits through the population - therefore, they 
must have had an impact on prehistoric groups.  
 
This study is an attempt to explore whether there are any characteristics associated 
with autism, or one of its key elements, which might influence material culture, 
specifically engagement with art. By exploring the association of different autistic traits 
with Palaeolithic art, a feature of the archaeological record which is considered to be 
social, I hope to highlight the complex pattern of selective pressures, and the impact of 
both technical and social abilities on this cultural development. 
 
Past studies have found that individuals with Autism are able to identify images faster 
and more accurately than controls during an embedded figures test (Baron-Cohen, 
1998; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Muth et al., 2014; Shah & Frith, 1983). The images 
of Palaeolithic art chosen for this study have hidden images in them. Identifying these 
images may be similar to identifying embedded figures. Therefore, it is expected that 
individuals with a high Autism Quotient (AQ) would be more successful at identifying 
them. Anecdotal evidence supports this theory. Individuals with Autism at an exhibition 
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of Palaeolithic plaquettes from Montrastruc Cave, France, could easily identify 
overlapping difficult to decipher images of animals (Spikins & Wright, 2016, p. 25). 
Thus, it is expected that individuals with a high AQ would perform better in this survey.  
 
5.2 Methods 
This study aimed to test the hypothesis that characteristics and components of autism 
would influence individuals’ engagement with material culture, in particular art. If 
individuals with high AQ were better able to perceive hidden figures in Palaeolithic 
artwork, this would support the hypothesis.  
 
To assess this, I collected evidence from a large population sample through an online 
survey. With advice and assistance from Penny Spikins and Barry Wright I developed 
an online survey, the ‘Visual Perception and Cognition Survey’ (VPCS; see Appendix 
A). This survey was divided into four sections. Firstly, participants provided information 
regarding employment, hobbies, experience of art, and Palaeolithic art. This allowed us 
to determine factors which might confound the results. Participants then completed the 
Autism Quotient (AQ) test. The AQ is a well-established self-report test used to quantify 
individuals’ traits and estimate their placement on the autism-spectrum (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2001). This test assesses 5 different traits of Autism: social interaction, 
communication, attention switching, imagination, and attention to detail. Thus, allowing 
the assessment of individual traits and their effect on perception. The test has been 
shown to have high validity for identifying individuals with high functioning Autism and 
Asperger syndrome and also for identifying broader phenotypes of ASC (Wheelwright 
et al., 2010; Woodbury-Smith et al., 2005). This makes it a useful substitute to 
diagnosis which allows a more in-depth analysis of individual traits. Participants were 
then asked to identify 3 images of animals, to prime them to search for embedded 
images of animals in the subsequent test images. 10 images were shown, where 
participants were asked to ‘tell us what you [they] see in the image’. Participants were 
asked to spend no more than 1 minute on each image to establish some control on 
how much the images were scrutinized, as the longer an individual spends searching 
an image the more features they are likely to identify. The 10 images were composed 
of 7 images of Palaeolithic artwork, 2 control images and 1 image produced by Peter 
Myers, an artist with Autism. The control images were interspersed within the test 
images to identify whether participants were seeing animals and other features where 
there were none. The modern image created by Peter Myers was used to investigate 
whether a modern example was more easily identifiable.  
 
This survey used self-selection sampling and was publicized in a press release 
connected to two publications (Spikins & Wright, 2016; Spikins et al., 2016), by 
departments at the University of York, the Autism Research Centre, and by multiple 
Autism support groups across the country including members of the National Autistic 
Society. Publicising in these areas enabled us to gain a large enough sample of 
individuals with high and low levels of autistic traits. The participants in this study are 
therefore not representative of the wider population as they will be composed of a 
larger proportion of individuals with high AQ. The Arts and Humanities Ethics 




1027 participants took part in the survey. Participants were separated differently for 
each test, based upon their experience of art, Palaeolithic art and their scores for 
different categories of the AQ test (social skills, communication, attention switching, 
imagination and attention to detail). Scores for categories of the AQ test were 
determined in the same way as the overall AQ score is determined, by adding one 
point for each answer which was related to an autistic trait whether the participant 
answered ‘definitely’ or ‘slightly’. Participants could score a maximum of 10 on each 
category. They were then divided into 2 groups for each category based upon their 
score. All participants were grouped in two different ways. Firstly, above 5 (high) or 
below and equal to 5 (low) due to 5 being the halfway point of possible scores. 
Secondly, they were grouped according to the average scores of each category, above 
average and below and equal to average. Due to the sampling method of this data 
being specifically designed to achieve a high proportion of autistic traits, it was 
necessary to utilize data from a previous study to avoid bias when determining the 
normal mean of each factor of the AQ test. The study by Hurst et al. (2007) was 
selected as an unbiased large (N=1005) sample which provided an alternative means 
to analyse our current dataset (table 4). These groups were then tested against their 
ability to correctly identify depictions in the images of Palaeolithic art. Due to the 
difficulty of the images, a correct identification was defined as identifying a single figure 
regardless of incorrect additions or whether there were more animal figures to be 
identified. Correct identifications scored 1 point. These scores were then collated into 
an overall score for all 8 test images, hereafter referred to as the ‘Correct Identification 
Score’.  Participants were also scored on the number of imagined images they saw. 
One point per image was scored for imagined images, regardless of whether a correct 
identification was also made. Scores were collated for the 8 test images and the 2 
control images. This score is hereafter termed the ‘Imagined Figure Score’. The 
participants were tested on each category and their Correct Identification and Imagined 
Figure scores were used to determine whether individuals’ scores on particular 
categories of the AQ test, or experience of art and Palaeolithic art were significantly 
correlated with scores on the images. Groups were also tested for difference in the 
number of imagined figures seen on the control images, as the identification of real 
figures in the test images may have reduced the number of imagined figures identified. 
 
Unless specifically stated statistical significance was determined using the chi square 
test to a threshold of 0.05. All statistical analysis was completed using SPSS. 
 
5.3 Results 
The results will be divided into several sections to investigate the results of the AQ test, 
Correct Identification Scores, and the Imagined Figure Score. 
AQ Test 
Figure 9 shows the distribution of participants scores on the AQ test. This shows that 
66% of participants (N=679) scored under the threshold suggestive of an ASC (here 
termed NT participants), whereas 33% (N=339) scored above the threshold suggestive 
of an ASC (here termed AU participants). This sample is not representative of the wider 
population (Baird et al., 2006; Baron-Cohen, Scott, et al., 2009). However, it allows us 
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to test the hypothesis of this study with greater confidence than a typical population 
might, due to the larger sample size of individuals with high AQ. 
 
Figure 10 shows the distribution of the participants across the different categories of 
the AQ test. This shows three things, the traits are distributed through our population, 
this sample has high rates of autistic traits (see table 4), and the extremes of the traits 
are represented in this sample. As expected, the distribution of scores was skewed 
towards larger scores for AU participants on all categories of the AQ test (figure 11). 
These results also show that Autism is composed of several different components, 
which may have been subject to different selection pressures. Further, it was found that 
AU participants were more likely to have above average experience of art outside of 
the classroom (P=0.002, figure 12A). However, they didn’t have more experience of 
Palaeolithic art (figure 12B). 
 
 
Figure 9. Participants distribution of AQ scores with the threshold of 32 marked (dotted 





Table 4. Showing the differences in means for each category of the AQ test between 












Figure 11. Distribution of participants scores on different categories of the AQ test, grouped according to those who scored below the 





Figure 12. Experience of art (A) and Palaeolithic art (B) grouped by AQ group. Showing that individuals with high AQ are more likely to 





Correct Identification Scores 
Figure 13 shows the distribution of correct identification scores of the participants, this 
is split by category of the AQ and whether the participant scored low (below or equal to 
5) or high (>5). As can be seen the score groups on all categories do not significantly 
differ. This point is further highlighted by figure 14, which shows that when using the 
mean score of each category according to Hurst et al. (2007), there is still no significant 
difference. Additionally, when the images are assessed individually there are very few 
cases of statistical significance (Appendix B). The lack of difference between the 
groups overall and the inconsistency of statistical significance on individual test images 
suggests that the ability of participants to identify the hidden figures in the images was 
not affected by their autistic traits. This is interesting as it contradicts the extensive 
work by psychologists on the WCC theory (4.1), and may suggest that identifying these 
images required different perceptive skills. However, this finding may be due to several 
limitations of the study which will be explored below (5.5). Therefore, we cannot reject 
the hypothesis.  
Imagined Figure Scores 
Participants imagined figure scores did show a significant difference. While all other 
categories of the AQ test do not show significant differences between high and low 
scorers in both methods of testing, individuals with a high attention to detail saw more 
imagined figures through the test than those with lower attention to detail (Figure 15 
and 16). Moreover, this is also seen consistently when assessing the images 
individually, with 6 out of 10 of the images showing this trend with statistical 
significance (Appendix C). Further, when the control images are assessed they each 
show strong statistical significance individually and when assessed together (P= 
<0.002, Figure 17). Therefore, individuals with high attention to detail were more likely 








Figure 13. Participants Correct Identification Scores separated by their score groups, below average (≤5) or above average (>5), for each 






Figure 14. Participants Correct Identification Scores separated by their score groups, below or equal to average or above average, for 









Figure 16. Participants Imagined Figure Scores separated by their score groups, below or equal to average or above average, for each 






Figure 17. The percentage of participants that saw imagined images on each of the control images and whether they saw images on both 





Spikins and Wright (2016, p. 25) put forward anecdotal evidence to suggest that 
individuals with Autism were better able to identify hidden figures in Palaeolithic 
plaquettes from Montrastruc Cave, France. The results of this study cannot verify this 
observation. However, it cannot be rejected either due to several limitations which will 
be outlined below (5.5). Nevertheless, this study has produced an interesting and 
unexpected result. Individuals with increased attention to detail were more likely to see 
imagined figures in both the test images and control images. 
 
These imagined images are a form of pareidolia. Pareidolia is where the mind creates 
a familiar pattern within an image where there is none. This has become popularized in 
recent years on social media due to people’s reactions to inanimate objects which 
resemble faces (figure 18). However, it has had a wider impact on Archaeology and in 
particular Paleoart interpretation. 
 
The Makapansgat pebble is the earliest case of a hominin taking interest in an item due 
to a pareidolic experience (figure 19). This pebble closely resembles a face in two 
orientations. It has not been artificially altered with all markings being natural. This 
pebble was transported between 2.5 and 3Ma to Makapansgat from an unknown and 
indeterminable distance, most likely by an australopithecine (Bednarik, 1998). This 
form of experience in our ancestors is also supported by artefacts such as the Berekhat 
Ram figurine, a piece of volcanic material with natural features reminiscent of the 
female form which were accentuated artificially 250-280,000 BP (d’Errico & Nowell, 
2000). A further example is the mask of La Roche Cotard, which was moderately 
worked and had a bone splinter pushed through a natural perforation to accentuate the 
face like characteristics of the stone 32,100 BP (Marquet & Lorblanchet, 2003). These 
examples highlight that the origins of art were highly influenced by experiences of 
pareidolic illusions, where the features eliciting this response were then accentuated.  
 
Hodgson (2008) argued that illusions such as this may be implicated in later art 
production. He argues that hyperimages, a form of pseudohallucination which may not 
be perceived as real, may be fragmentary, and are connected to a particular space or 
object from which it may appear to radiate, may be a principal cause or inspiration for 
much Franco-Cantabrian Palaeolithic cave art. Hyperimages occur due to a decrease 
in external stimuli, an increase in activity within the sensory modalities, an increase in 
drive states due to suppression of instinctual needs (such as food and sleep), a 
decrease in inhibition and a change in the dynamic between internal and external input 
(Beck & Rector, 2003). Hodgson suggests that all of these conditions were likely to 
occur in the Palaeolithic. Extended concentration on animals during the hunt would 
cause their images to become imprinted upon the neural circuits which would cause a 
mental system already sensitive to animal detection to become further primed. 
Individuals would have been mentally and physically exhausted, and possibly have 
suffered from starvation due to failed hunts which would increase the sensitivity of the 
visual system to perceiving items which may be construed as food. The darkness of the 
caves they were entering would also have had two effects. Firstly, it would have 
substantially decreased external stimuli, and secondly it would have provoked fear of 
predators. Thus, further increasing the sensitivity of prehistoric people to detect 
animals falsely from suggestive natural features. Hodgson cites the fact that 10-15% of 
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Palaeolithic art is situated in close proximity to or incorporates natural features, and 
highlights that hyperimagery may explain many of the features found in Franco-
Cantabrian cave art (White, 2003, pp. 112–116).  
 
Pareidolic illusions similar to these hyperimages, caused by intense concentration on 
one stimuli for an extended period of time, have also been shown to have a significant 
impact on how archaeologists may misinterpret prehistoric art. The most extraordinary 
example of this being the falsely interpreted 350 boulders of the Xiaojinggou salvage 
yard, Mongolia. These boulders were thought to have extraordinary depictions which 
represented the earliest religion in the world. The patron who collected these boulders 
sought the advice of rock art specialists before applying for the site to become a 
UNESCO World Heritage Site. However, upon inspection the specialists found that the 
art was in fact non-existent and nothing more than a pareidolic illusion shared among 
the students and patron at the site. The workers at the site were nevertheless 
convinced of what they were seeing and after several days of intense searching even 
the specialists began to perceive these illusions of art (Bednarik, 2017). This shows 
how this phenomenon may have an extraordinary influence over individuals’ 
perception, particularly when there is a shared belief. 
 
Participants of the current study, particularly those with high attention to detail (a 
technical trait), similarly perceived illusions of art. Individuals were primed to search for 
animals. Thus, their visual system was sensitive to the detection of animals in a similar 
way to Hodgson’s (2008) cave artists and the archaeologists at Xiaojinggou. Although 
the participants were not subject to the extreme circumstances and urgency that the 
cave artists would have been subject to, this priming was enough to elicit a series of 
illusory false positives.   
 
Bednarik (2017) states that individuals see what they expect to see because it is more 
time-consuming to see what isn’t expected. The visual system uses approximations 
such as this to rapidly relay information to produce an appropriate response. In 
dangerous situations Bednarik argues that false positives are less costly than 
negatives, therefore false positives such as pareidolia are not selected against. 
Interestingly, he suggests pareidolia is an effect of people's tendency to attempt to see 
patterns in meaningless information. It may be interesting to posit for future research 
that individuals with more systemizing cognition may be more prone to doing this and 




   
Figure 18. An image of pareidolia on an inanimate object which resembles a smiling 





Figure 19. The Makapansgat Pebble, in two orientations showing two different face-like 
patterns caused by natural processes (Bednarik 1998). 
 
Pareidolia has been extensively studied in psychological research through the use of 
Rorschach inkblot tests. These ink blots use an amorphous shape, symmetry, 
differences in colour and hue, and blank spaces to evoke the perception of non-
79 
 
existent figures. Most commonly, the figures perceived are of animals (25-50%) and 
are very rarely of human faces (Schott, 2014). This is significant as depictions of 
humans are rare in Palaeolithic artwork, which may suggest that the artists were having 
a similar experience to participants viewing an inkblot test. As notable artists such as 
Leonardo da Vinci and Alexander Cozens have expressed that they were influenced by 
this phenomenon, and in particular that da Vinci had this reaction when staring at 
stains upon a wall (Schott, 2014), the notion that Palaeolithic artists and the 
participants of this study may have been inspired in the same way is not unrealistic. 
Therefore, we will investigate whether individuals with ASC have shown differences on 
the inkblot test and tests of pareidolia in previous research, and what neurological 
differences may cause individuals with high attention to detail to experience these 
illusions more often. 
 
The areas of the brain activated by inkblot tests in neurotypical individuals are the 
amygdala, right temporal pole, anterior prefrontal cortex and bilateral occipitotemporal 
regions (Asari et al., 2010b). Asari et al. (2010a) found that the size of the amygdala 
related to the rate of unique responses on the test. Further, in a later paper they 
presented that the amygdala modulated the responses of the other areas listed above. 
It positively modulates the connection between the anterior prefrontal cortex and the 
temporal pole, but negatively modulates the connection between the temporal pole and 
occipitotemporal regions. This creates a system where increased activity in the 
amygdala reduces the accuracy of spontaneous recognition of ambiguous stimuli in the 
occipitotemporal region due to an increase in emotional input on perception. This leads 
to the anterior prefrontal regions testing internal representations against the stimuli in 
an attempt to rectify this issue. Hence, increased activation of the amygdala leads to a 
more emotion driven, top-down perceptual processing based upon previous 
experiences, which in turn may lead to unusual responses (Asari et al., 2010b). 
Unusual responses on this test have been correlated with artistic creativity (Schott, 
2014).  
 
Interestingly, the amygdala of individuals with ASC has been characterized in 
contrasting research as being hypoactive and hyperactive, as well as having atypical 
connectivity with other regions (in particular with the MPFC), and decreased volume 
(Zalla & Sperduti, 2013). Limited research has been conducted using the Rorschach 
inkblot test on participants with ASC. This research has shown that individuals with 
ASC were less organized in the way they scanned the images, created fantastical 
combinations, gave unusual summaries of the appearance of the stimuli, and perceived 
discordant combinations (Dykens et al., 1991; Ghaziuddin et al., 1995; Minassian et al., 
2005). Further, their answers were largely spurred by details of the images rather than 
their overall form, with an exceptionally high focus on animals (41±31%) and a low rate 
of human figures identified (9±7%: Manuela et al., 2015). 
 
Dykens et al. (1991) suggest that the unique responses of individuals with ASC were a 
product of poor reality testing. Atypical functioning of the amygdala likely causes this. If 
the amygdala is hyperactive then this would cause an increased emotional response 
and a decreased accuracy of spontaneous recognition. Additionally, atypical 
connectivity with the MPFC would lead to a reduction in reality testing of these 
emotionally driven internal perceptions, leading to unusual responses. Atypicalities in 
connectivity with the MPFC have also been hypothesised to inhibit the production of 
hierarchical relevance maps of stimuli thus causing intense reactions. The startle 
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response to sudden fearful stimuli has been shown to be intact with limited or no 
latency in reaction times (Bernier et al., 2005; South et al., 2008). However, there is 
contradictory evidence as to whether the response is accentuated or not (Gaigg & 
Bowler, 2007; Markram et al., 2008). Currently, conclusions cannot assume that 
individuals with ASC or high attention to detail have a more intense experience of 
apprehension as they enter a cave and therefore see more imagined images through 
fear.  
 
Withdrawn from a state of fear, individuals with high attention to detail saw more 
imagined images in the current study. It is noteworthy that Manuela et al. (2015) also 
found that individuals with ASC gave a higher number of answers on the inkblot test. 
However, they ascribed this to a difficulty in forming representations. In light of the 
current results, I would argue that this is more likely a product of seeing more 
representations as a result of high attention to detail, rather than not being able to 
project imagined images onto the stimuli. Currently, we may state that individuals with 
ASC present unusual responses to the Rorschach test, identify more images, and 
largely focus on details of the inkblot as the stimuli for imagined images. Further, we 
may suggest that neurological differences in the size of and atypical activation and 
connection of the amygdala may account for these differences. 
 
Significantly, individuals who are artistic are more likely to express unique responses in 
a similar way to individuals with ASC. This may suggest a direct link between the 
perception of pareidolia and an artistic character. The current study shows a significant 
relationship between having an above average experience of art and high attention to 
detail (P=0.012). Thus, in the current study we have shown a relationship between 
attention to detail, susceptibility to pareidolic illusions, and artistic experience. 
However, figure 20 shows that while high attention to detail may increase susceptibility 
to pareidolia, experience of art does not. Hence, we must conclude that high attention 
to detail singularly predicts susceptibility to pareidolic illusions. Meanwhile, high 
attention to detail increases the likelihood of engaging in art, but is by no means a 
determining factor. I would posit for future research that individuals with high attention 
to detail may have differences in the connectivity and activation of the amygdala, 
similar to individuals with ASC, which cause this increased susceptibility to pareidolic 
illusions. Practical functional analysis of these differences requires future investigation. 
To the best of my knowledge this is the largest investigation of autistic traits and 
pareidolia to date. 
 
Individuals with ASC are characterized as having reduced imagination. Children with 
Autism have been shown to have difficulty with social pretence (Leslie, 1987). Further, 
they were shown to have difficulty with general creativity, when asked to create multiple 
drawings from minimalist stimuli, and ‘imaginative creativity’ (creating impossible 
scenarios and drawing impossible pictures). Also, when asked what a shape could be, 
responses of individuals with ASC were more determined by the shape than controls 
(Craig & Baron-Cohen, 1999; Craig et al., 2001). This evidence suggests that 
individuals with a high AQ should have lower imagined figure scores in our survey. We 
may however speculate for further research, that the illusions experienced by our 
participants stem from ‘reality-based creativity’ (creativity not reliant on abstraction). As 
shown by Craig and Baron-Cohen (1999), individuals with ASC are more reliant on this 
form of creativity, based upon features of the stimuli. As stated above, pareidolia and 
hyperimages are stimulated by suggestive features of an object. Thus, they don’t rely 
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on imaginative creativity. This likely explains, and is supported by, the lack of 
association between imagination scores on the AQ test and imagined figure scores.       
 
 
Figure 20. Showing that participants with high attention to detail were more likely to 
have a higher imagined figure score, while those with a high experience of art were not. 
 
From an archaeological perspective these results are interesting for several reasons. 
Firstly, it further contributes to and expands Hodgson’s (2008) hyperimagery theory by 
showing that individuals with high attention to detail would be more susceptible to these 
events and therefore more likely to produce artwork. It is possible that through top-
down processing individuals with high attention to detail perceive specific features 
which mimic details of animals, for example the ventral line and face of a horse (figure 
21), and through the hyperemotive effect outlined above experience illusions more 
often which form the inspiration for the art. This is also connected to another 
interpretation proposed by Hodgson (2003), that the cave art was practice and priming 
for implicit memory and perceptual abilities. By using fractured lines in Palaeolithic 
artwork to create ambiguity as to what the form represents, it provided practice for the 
identification of wild occluded fauna while hunting, training individuals to identify 
animals based upon particular details. Hence, Upper Palaeolithic groups were actively 
training themselves to have high attention to detail and implicitly recognize animals 
based upon ambiguous and suggestive shapes.  
 
This suggestion relates to the second significant archaeological point. High attention to 
detail is a technical trait which has been positively selected for through time, as can be 
seen by the progressive development of intricate lithics. The results of this survey posit 
it as a highly significant factor for not only the perception of art, but its production and 
origins. Further, it is an example of how individuals with autistic traits may have 
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positively influenced those around them, by training their perception. This may suggest 
that art, a highly social activity, was significantly impacted and perhaps a product of the 
technical trait, high attention to detail. 
 
 
Figure 21. A possible example of natural features from Cresswell Crags on the right 
(highlighted blue) which resemble the ventral line, legs, and face of a horse; with a 
carving of a horse (left) positioned above the ventral line. 
5.5 Limitations 
As noted above limitations of the study did not allow us to test the theory that 
individuals with high AQ would be better able to identify hidden images in Palaeolithic 
art. Individuals with a high experience of art and Palaeolithic art were much more likely 
to correctly see the hidden figures (figure 22). Therefore, these were significant 
confounding factors. However, even when a large subsample of 704 individuals with 
low experience of art and Palaeolithic art was selected there was no significant 
difference in ability to see the hidden figures in the art (figure 23). Further issues 
highlighted by the participants were the quality of the images, which was determined by 
the quality available online, and the visibility of the survey on different devices, for 
example some participants using their phones struggled to see the survey. Therefore, it 
should be specified in the future that a computer must be used. However, even then 
settings of the monitor such as brightness and contrast which are beyond our control 
may impact participants ability to identify embedded figures. Hence the only reliable 
way to assess the ability of individuals to perceive embedded figures in Palaeolithic art 
is through a lab based study. These limitations did not confound results based upon 
imagined figure scores. Although a relationship was found with participants experience 
of art and Palaeolithic art, when the subsample of 704 participants was used the 
differences between those with high and low attention to detail were still maintained 
(figure 24). Further, although differences in the ability to clearly see the images would 
make it more difficult to perceive the faint lines of the Palaeolithic artwork it would not 











Figure 23. Subgroup of 704 participants with low experience of art and Palaeolithic art 
showing no difference in correctly identifying the embedded images. 
 
 
Figure 24. Subgroup of 704 participants with low experience of art and Palaeolithic art 
showing that the difference in quantity of pareidolic illusion between participants with 
high and low attention to detail is maintained. 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
This study has attempted to test the hypothesis that characteristics and components of 
Autism would influence individuals’ engagement with material culture, in particular art. 
Initially, it was thought that if participants with a high overall AQ, or score on a specific 
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trait, were able to perceive hidden figures in the art more easily and accurately, this 
would provide support for the hypothesis. Unfortunately, due to limitations of the 
survey, we were unable to test this theory. However, we did find that individuals with 
high attention to detail were more likely to see non-existent figures on the stimuli. This 
reaction is a form of pareidolia, where the mind attempts to create a familiar pattern 
from random visual data.  
 
From studies of Rorschach inkblot tests, we know that the perception of ambiguous 
stimuli relies on a network involving the PFC, occipital cortex, and the temporal poles, 
which is modulated by the amygdala (Asari et al., 2010b). Autism has been related to 
hypo and hyperactivity of the amygdala as well as atypical connectivity (Zalla & 
Sperduti, 2013). This may be a cause for the differences seen in this study, as it would 
lead to more emotionally driven, top-down processing with depreciated reality testing, 
due to lower connectivity between the amygdala and the PFC. This would make 
individuals with autism more susceptible to pareidolic illusions. While the current study 
does not reveal a significant difference in the AU sample, this may be due to the fact 
that our participants were not formally diagnosed, and individuals could score above 
the 32 threshold without scoring highly for attention to detail. It should be posited for 
future research that individuals with high attention to detail may have similar 
differences in the amygdala modulated network to individuals with ASC. 
 
These results support the hypothesis of this study, by displaying that attention to detail 
is connected with both frequency of pareidolic illusions and likelihood of engaging in 
art. These findings are also supported by past research which found that detail focus is 
associated with artistic ability (Drake, 2014; Drake et al., 2010). This has then been 
connected to Hodgson’s theories on the origins of art. Firstly, individuals using the art 
as priming cues to recognize details of animals are teaching themselves to enhance a 
technical trait connected to Autism (Hodgson, 2003). Secondly, individuals with high 
attention to detail would be more susceptible to hyperimages and thus more likely to 
produce artwork in caves (Hodgson, 2008). The perception of pareidolic illusions and 
hyperimages, due to their being determined by features of the object, are suggested to 
rely on reality-based creativity - a form not impaired in individuals with ASC. This study 
is significant for two reasons: it is the largest study of autistic traits and pareidolia to 
date; and it has provided quantifiable evidence for the impact of technical autistic traits 




Chapter 6: Summary and Final Conclusions 
 
This dissertation has assessed whether the cognitive evolution of our species can be 
fully explained through pressures for sociality, or a more complex mechanism of both 
technical and social pressures took place.  
 
Currently, social theories are the most popular and accepted explanations for our 
evolutionary success (2.2). By assessing the evidence for cognitive evolution in depth 
we have confirmed that there has been substantial gradual change in areas of the brain 
specialized for sociality through time (3). However, many changes were linked to 
technical ability. These developments mostly occurred in tandem with social changes. 
However, it is important to note that long range connections govern social functions. 
When these connections are changed, they are likely to cause behavioural differences, 
as is seen in Autism (4.1). Thus, connectivity is a large factor that governs social and 
technical ability, which is only slightly explored.  
 
Due to differences in ontogeny it is thought that Neanderthals had a different neural 
connectivity. This likely led to lower levels of social functioning than has previously 
been suggested. However, Neanderthals may have possessed unique technical 
functions, such as the ability to create virtual mental models of objects which allowed a 
more efficient method of tool production. The decreased white matter and shorter 
ontogeny of earlier hominins would suggest even more accentuated differences. 
Further, the disparity between estimates of Neanderthal group size using the SBH and 
estimates based upon archaeological evidence, suggests that complicating non-social 
evolutionary pressures may have affected the relationship. This supports the idea that 
multiple evolutionary pressures, including social and technical, were driving our 
cognitive evolution. 
 
Individuals with ASC commonly exhibit social difficulties; however, they commonly 
have significant accentuations in technical abilities. ASC was assessed as an alternate, 
more technical, adaptive strategy and the impact autistic traits may have had on our 
ancestors determined. 
 
The behavioural analysis of individuals with ASC explored the social difficulties often 
experienced, and the technical advantages thought to compensate for them (4.1). This 
theory has led to multiple studies of how autistic traits may have influenced prehistoric 
societies, with archaeologists such as Humphrey (1998), Kellman (1998), and Spikins 
and Wright (2016) investigating artefacts which may have been influenced by autistic 
traits. This has been met with resistance from Bednarik (2013, 2016) and Pickard et al. 
(2011). They state that Autism is a deleterious by-product of human variation with 
difficulties that would have inhibited contribution and led to negative selection. They 
counter argue that trance states and psychedelic drugs would have induced a mindset 
conducive to the creation of Palaeolithic artwork. This claim is not substantiated by 
psychological research, as neither produces spontaneous talent (Spikins, Scott and 
Wright in press). Further, the genetics of the condition show that there are two 
genetically different variants. One of which is caused by common variants under 
positive selection, and isn’t associated with intellectual disability (4.3). One final 




Chapter 5 provides a study designed to test the hypothesis that characteristics and 
components of autism would influence individual’s engagement with material culture, in 
particular art. This study utilized a large self-selection sample (N=1027) with high rates 
of autistic traits. Participants completed the Visual Perception and Cognition Survey, 
which required them to search for hidden figures in Palaeolithic art. The survey found 
that individuals with the technical trait high attention to detail were significantly more 
susceptible to seeing imagined pareidolic illusions in the images. This is likely due to 
atypical amygdala activation and connectivity causing an increase in top-down emotion 
based processing. However, other explanations, which are not incompatible with the 
amygdala theory, are that individuals with high attention to detail have a more 
systemizing cognition and therefore are more likely to patternize random stimuli into 
figures, or they are more likely to see natural features which mimic specific details of 
animals. Further, the basis of these illusions is argued not to be strict abstract 
imagination, but rather reality-based creativity centred upon features of the observed 
object, which is not impaired in individuals with ASC.  
 
The cause requires further analysis. Nevertheless, this study has also shown a direct 
connection between high attention to detail and the likelihood of engaging in art. The 
finding that high attention to detail promotes pareidolic illusions, and is also related to 
artistic experience, supports, and adds to Hodgson’s (2008) theory of hyperimagery. 
Thus, this study has provided empirical evidence which suggests individuals with the 
technical autistic trait, high attention to detail, would be more likely to produce 
Palaeolithic art. Although, this doesn’t suggest that they produced it exclusively, as our 
study has shown that a large proportion of participants with high experience of art did 
not have high attention to detail. Additionally, Hodgson’s (2003) theory of using 
fragmented images to train individuals to recognize animals from minimal details 
suggests that Palaeolithic people were actively training to use this trait. Therefore, high 
attention to detail is a technical trait which may be in part responsible for this major 
change in human culture.  
 
Thus, we have shown that the evolutionary pressures acting on the hominin mind were 
more complex than the social theories allow. Technical pressures have had a large 
impact on hominin cognition both between species, and as shown by our case study of 
ASC, within species. Technical pressures are significant enough to cause alternate 
cognitive strategies and traits which conflict with social functions. One technical ability, 
high attention to detail, has been associated with the origin of a significant cultural 
development, art, and was likely a desirable trait in Palaeolithic groups. Thus, the role 































































































This survey was designed in cooperation with Dr Penny Spikins and Dr Barry Wright, 
with both Dr Spikins and myself contributing images and questions, and Dr Wright 
providing advice for further refinement. The survey was initially disseminated through a 
press release for the book ‘The Prehistory of Autism’ (Spikins and Wright 2016). The 
three of us further disseminated the survey to Autism support groups across the 
country, and the Autism Research Centre at the University of Cambridge sent it to their 
database of volunteers. 
 
From the raw data collected I created a database suitable for analysis. I conducted all 
analysis and produced all graphics. Some of these results then formed part of a paper 
(Spikins, Scott and Wright in press). This paper discusses the significance of local 
processing bias (or high attention to detail) for talent at realistic depiction, and its 
implications for understanding the cause of similarities between the artwork of 
individuals with Autism and Upper Palaeolithic artwork. For this paper I provided a 
paragraph on the genetics of Autism based upon section 4.3 of this thesis, a graphic of 
a block design test (figure 7 in this thesis), some statistical data and a graphic of the 
relationship between high AQ and high attention to detail based upon the survey. The 
results are discussed in more detail in the present thesis, and the interpretation of the 





Appendix B – Tables of Correct Identification Scores for individual categories of the AQ test.  
 











Appendix C – Tables of Imagined Figure Scores for individual categories of the AQ test.  
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